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intRoduCtion
Aaron Matta and Tamara Takács
In an increasingly interconnected and globalised world, the impact of security 
threats – be it economic, terrorism, poverty, regional conflicts or environmental 
challenges – spread faster and wider than ever before. The international com-
munity has acknowledged that these challenges cannot be solved in isolation. 
The concept of human security arose during the ‘90s as a response to address 
these challenges within the UN system (UNDP human Development Report 
of 1994 and later the Kofi Annan Report ‘In larger freedom’ of 2005). Since 
then the concept has evolved and gained significant attention as a multidisci-
plinary approach of the international community in an effort to respond to com-
plex security challenges. furthermore, there has been a shift in the perception 
of international security, which went from the classical notion of national secu-
rity approaches focusing on military threats, into a more holistic all-encompass-
ing notion of human security that focuses on the individuals and the 
communities they live in as well. 
The EU has struggled throughout the evolution of its Common foreign and 
Security Policy to place itself as an assertive global and regional player. The 
new changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty and the emergence of the 
EEAS, together with the current regional and international challenges it is faced 
with give a unique opportunity for a renewed focus on existing approaches on 
human security and the Union’s long term objectives in foreign policy. The hu-
man security framework could have the potential of bringing an added value 
in framing the EU’s strategic narrative and enforcing coordination and coop-
eration between rival EU policy streams on the institutional level but also its 
external security and development-oriented policies. Many of the general prin-
ciples of the human security conceptualisation have been already implicitly 
accepted and implemented in the EU’s security and human rights discourse.1 
It can thus be argued that human security already plays an major role in the 
Union’s comprehensive crisis response and operational coordination in conflict 
prevention, peacebuilding and mediation; crisis management and development 
programmes; but also humanitarian aid and climate change agendas. Nonethe-
less, there is an apparent lack of consensus around the use and purpose of 
human security within the EU’s foreign policy toolkit. An explicit reference to 
the concept in EU’s foreign policy could potentially generate greater coherence 
in EU’s external action in the long term, yet it is still being resisted within the 
EU institutional framework as there are tensions between the supranational 
1 See Aurel Sari and Ramses A. Wessel (eds.), ‘human Rights in EU Crisis Management 
Operations: A Duty to Respect and to Protect?’ , 6 CLEER Working Papers (2012). 
cleer14-5_inside_proof-01.indb   7 1/7/2015   2:04:44 PM
8CLEER WORKING PAPERS 2014/5 Matta and Takács
and intergovernmental nature of the Union on the one hand, and the difficulties 
surrounding international interventions on the other hand. furthermore, par-
ticular issues arise in coordinating civil and military operations. While such 
operations may function in natural disasters situations, this might not be the 
same during armed military interventions. Nonetheless, taking into account the 
post-Lisbon institutional changes, the review of the European Security Strat-
egy and the exceptional position of the EU – by sharing competences in these 
fields together with its member states – make the use of the human security 
rather tempting. Including the concept of human security in EU’s foreign policy 
could exponentially shift its status as an international security actor, while at 
the same time serve as an additional push for a more coherent and consistent 
EU foreign policy.
This Working Paper issue is the result of the Centre’s recent research project 
Human Security as a new operational framework for enhancing Human Rights 
protection in the EU’s Security & Migration Policies, co-financed by the Euro-
pean Union, under its Lifelong Learning Programme. Some of the papers in-
cluded in this issue were presented during the conference ‘human security as 
a tool for comprehensive approach for human rights and security linkages in 
EU foreign policy’, organised by CLEER at the T.M.C Asser Institute, in The 
hague, on 6 December 2013.The editors are particularly grateful for the guid-
ance and support provided by Professors Ramses Wessel and Steven Block-
mans, conference directors and members of the CLEER Governing Board, 
toward the implementation of the event.
In the first paper, ‘The EU’s Human Security Agenda within the Context of 
International Law’, Anna Wardell and Stephan Keukeleire focus on how the EU 
should use the concept of human security when keeping with its commitments 
to international law, protection of human rights and effective multilateralism 
enshrined in the European Security Strategy 2003. They look into the context 
of human security in the broader sense so as to depict its interaction with in-
ternational law. They also take into consideration the 2004 Barcelona Report, 
where Wardell and Keukeleire compare the proposed principles of human 
security with the vision of the EU. In ‘The EU human security and the insulation 
of the CFSP: comparing recent policy and judicial tendencies’, hans Merket 
looks into the EU institutions’ policy rhetoric on human security and evaluates 
the legal complexity of its inherent coherence rationale. he examines recent 
policy patterns and judicial tendencies to find out challenges and the potential 
of the EU to exceed the insulation of the CfSP in order to enhance a compre-
hensive security approach. he notes the agreement amongst the relevant EU 
institutions concerning the interlinking nature between development, security 
and human rights policies, but points to the fragile credibility that the current 
modalities of such interlinkages in actual policies draw. In her paper about 
‘CSDP crisis management operations – between human security and the “com-
prehensive approach”’ Monica Oproiu illustrates and analyses the EU approach 
to human security in crisis management operations through cases studies. In 
doing so, she looks into past CSDP operations in the Western Balkans, in 
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particular in Bosnia and herzegovina, as well as the present operations in 
Africa and Asia. She recognises a changing character of the EU crisis manage-
ment operations with more interest in short term crisis management and calls 
for these operations to be integrated in the wider policy framework, coupled 
with distinct philosophy in its design and better communication. The last paper, 
contributed by hannes Peltonen looks into the context-dependent understand-
ing of the concept ‘international community’ from the human security and RtoP 
perspective, so as to identify the role of the EU therein and detect the charac-
teristics of the EU’s actions in this regard. he sees the EU’s most important 
contribution when acting as a ‘coordinator’ within the international community 
in the human security context, given its normative power, networks and capa-
bilities, albeit with a higher risk of accountability.
A special word of thanks goes to Tomasz Prądzyński for his thorough edito-
rial assistance. 
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tHE Eu’s Human sECuRity agEnda witHin tHE ContExt 
of intERnationaL Law
Anna Wardell and Stephan Keukeleire1
1. INTRODUCTION
Since it first appeared in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
report2 in 1994, the concept of human Security has over the last 20 years been 
refined, broadened, narrowed, debated, criticised, all but discarded and then 
seemingly resurrected for the Post-2015 Development Agenda.3 The exact 
definition of human security, originally described as ‘freedom from fear and 
freedom from want’4, has always been rather unclear and remains the subject 
of intensive debate.5 human security has been labelled a ‘rallying cry’ as well 
as an academic concept and a potential foreign policy tool.6 As Paris points 
out, ‘everyone is for [human security, but] only a few people have a clear idea 
of what it means.’ 7 Nonetheless in the last decade the EU has toyed with the 
idea of adopting a framework of security as a basis for its foreign policy. The 
Barcelona Report of 20048 and the 2007 Madrid Report,9 Commissioned by 
then high Representative Solana, both set about outlining how human secu-
rity could be used as a backdrop for the EU’s foreign, security and defence 
policy.
1 Anna Wardell is Academic Assistant in the EU International Relations and Diplomacy Stud-
ies Department at the College of Europe, Bruges. Stephan Keukeleire is Jean Monnet Professor 
at ‘Leuven International and European Studies’ (LINES) of the University of Leuven and Visiting 
Professor at the EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies Department at the College of 
Europe, Bruges.
2 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report (New York: Oxford 
University Press 1994).
3 See UNGA 18 June 2014, ‘Thematic Debate ‘Responding to the opportunities and chal-
lenges of the 21st Century: human Security and the post-2015 development agenda’
4 See UNDP, supra note 2.
5 See for example M. Martin and T. Owen (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Human Security 
(Abingdon: Routledge 2014) and S. Tadjbakhsh and A. Chenoy, Human Security: Concepts and 
Implications (London: Routledge 2007).
6 G. Oberleitner, ‘human Security and human Rights,’ 8 European Training and Research 
Centre on Human Rights Occasional Paper Series 2002, at 5.
7 R. Paris, ‘human Security: Paradigm Shift or hot Air?’,2 International Security 2001, 87-102.
8 U. Albrecht, et al., A human security doctrine for Europe: the Barcelona Report of the Study 
Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, Barce-
lona, Spain, 2004
9 U. Albrecht, et al., ‘A European way of security: the Madrid Report of the human Security 
Study Group’, Human Security Study Group (Madrid 2007).
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One of the principal debates has been centred around the dichotomy between 
a broad versus narrow definition of human security.10 Concerns abound that 
an overly-broad conception of the idea will lead to overlap and confusion be-
tween otherwise separate and distinct policy areas and concepts, such as 
human rights and development. however, few of these discussions take into 
account the international legal framework in which the EU is entrenched, along 
with its commitment to obligations under the United Nations Charter, and to the 
promotion of human rights, which are fundamentally bound up in the interna-
tional legal order. 
Therefore, this paper aims to discuss how human security relates to the 
fundamental principles of international law, particularly in the light of more recent 
multilateral commitments to the concept. This discussion can illuminate how 
the EU could view human security in keeping with its commitment to interna-
tional law, human rights and effective multilateralism as set out in the Euro-
pean Security Strategy of 2003.11 It posits that a broad and comprehensive 
view is the way forward for the EU’s discourse, in respect of its international 
legal commitments. This may be also politically the only way of ensuring a 
concept which is legitimate and accepted globally, but leaves the EU in a di-
lemma as to how it should reconcile its own CSDP outlook with the reserved 
approach of the international community and the strong non-interventionist 
stance of the UNGA.
firstly therefore, the article will outline the interaction between human se-
curity as a usefully broad and encompassing notion, and the strict principles 
of international law. Secondly, focussing on the work of the 2004 Barcelona 
Report in particular, it will examine in the light of international law the proposed 
principles of human security, which offer a rather restrictive version of how the 
EU could take this as a guiding concept. 
2. hUMAN SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Given that human security is so often conceived as a political concept or a 
foreign policy tool, little has already been written on the subject of its interaction 
with international law. Nonetheless, it is worth examining the potential relation-
ship between the two, not least because whatever conception of human secu-
rity is utilised, it must be compatible with the fundamental principles of 
international law. Advancing further, the idea has been raised that human se-
curity could contribute to a new normative international framework. 
Despite the scholarly debate surrounding the definition and its embellishment 
in policy documents, ‘international law has been reluctant to respond to the 
rise of human security.’12 Gerd Oberleitner raises a number of important ques-
10 See S. Tadjbaksh, ‘In defense of the broad view of human security’, in M. Martin and 
T. Owen, supra note 5.
11 European Council, ‘A secure Europe in a Better World’, European Security Strategy (De-
cember 2003, available at < http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>.
12 G. Oberleitner, ‘human Security: A Challenge to International Law?’, 11 Global Governance 
2005, at 186.
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tions: whether human security is ‘new’ to international law, or whether it has 
already been accounted for; what are the challenges that it could create for 
international law, and whether in fact international law is potentially an obstacle 
to human security.13 he suggests that human security could potentially be an 
asset to international law, bringing it ‘better in line with the requirements of 
today’s world’14 in light of the rise of non-state actors and the erosion of the 
strictest conception of state sovereignty. Examining the United Nations Charter 
as the fundamental text of international law, he explains that human security 
could well serve as a concept that would bridge the gap between and reunite 
the conflicting but seminal principles: sovereign equality (article 2.1), – that 
goes hand in hand with territorial integrity, political independence (2.4) and 
non-interference in domestic matters (2.7), and, the promotion of the respect 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms (article 1.3). The combination of 
these premises could ultimately be the key to the realisation of the first prin-
ciple of the UN Charter: maintaining world peace and security (article 1.1). 
human security is also billed as a pluri-disciplinary or pan-dimensional concept 
that could finally eliminate the divisions between human rights, development, 
security and humanitarian assistance.15 With this heavy burden of expectations 
to bear, it is worth examining how human security relates to these two seminal 
principles: human rights and (usually State) security.
human rights, when addressed from the perspective of international law, 
are defined as protecting citizens against interference with these rights by the 
State. International judicial human rights protection mechanisms allow for in-
dividual petitions brought against their government for an action, or possibly a 
failure to act, which compromised the fundamental freedoms of its citizen. In-
ternational human rights courts subject the admissibility of claims to a number 
of criteria, not least the condition of exhaustion of domestic remedies. Even 
the non-judiciable human rights instruments which are purely declaratory (such 
as the Universal Declaration of human Rights (UDhR))16 serve as a reference 
point for governments and as a basis for national human rights legislation. The 
judicial protection of human rights internationally requires a state in which the 
rule of law is established and where the state is a signatory to an international 
human rights instrument. human rights are also restricted to violations purveyed 
by the state, or areas where the state can be judged to have been negligent in 
failing to prevent a violation by a private actor. 
however, as Ruti Teitel points out, we must not ignore that with the ‘war on 
terror’ and the rise in importance of non-state entities such as Al-Qaida, the 
protection of human rights by the state itself is no longer the only goal.17 In 
relation to human security, human rights are indubitably at the core of human 
security in that the principal international human rights instruments, such as 
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ogata and Cels, cited in G. Oberleitner, supra note 12, at 188.
16 Universal Declaration of human Rights (UDhR) 1948.
17 R. Teitel, ‘humanity’s Law’, Lecture at hannah Arendt Center (November 2011), available 
at <http://vimeo.com/33739366>. 
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the UDhR promote primarily the ‘right to life, liberty and security of person,’18 
from which the ‘freedom from fear and freedom from want’ may be construed. 
however, human security could have the vocation to be applied by and towards 
non-state actors, and to be promoted as an international standard in states that 
are unable or unwilling to provide human rights protection for their own citizens. 
In this way human security should be viewed as a broader, more practical no-
tion and one that encompasses a wider spectrum of issues.
Regarding security, it should be noted that international peace and security 
as conceived in the UN Charter (article 1.1) concerns collective security among 
states. Its corollaries are state sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-inter-
vention, principles which govern the relations between states on the interna-
tional scene. The fundamental nature of state sovereignty, as a safeguard 
against aggression and the right of a government to pursue its internal affairs 
without external interference, has been the pillar of international law and the 
basis of state-to-state relations since the Charter.
however, it is noteworthy that a perceptible erosion of this conception has 
already been contemplated and invoked in the form of the Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P) doctrine, developed in 2001 by the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and enshrined by the UN General 
Assembly in the Outcome Document of the 2005 United Nations World 
Summit.19,20 This concept consisting of three pillars has been formulated in 
understandably circumspect terms. It is first confirmed that the primary respon-
sibility for the protection of its people from genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and ethnic cleansing falls with the state, followed by the affirmation 
of the international community to ‘encourage and assist’ states in fulfilling this 
responsibility. finally, only if the national authorities are ‘manifestly failing’21 to 
protect the population from the four threats may the international community 
assist, firstly by ‘appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means’ 
and then possibly by ‘collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through 
the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on 
a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations’.22 
The numerous safeguards and provisos for ‘collective action’ are conspicuous, 
and it should be noted that great care has been taken in all of these multilat-
eral enunciations of R2P never to suggest a right to intervene in the internal 
affairs of the state.23 
It is interesting to evoke the R2P doctrine when discussing human security, 
firstly because the two ideas have been likened in academic discourse as 
conceptual bases for ‘softening’ the interpretation of state sovereignty in inter-
national law. The same outcome document of the 2005 World Summit that 
outlined R2P contains the first multilateral acknowledgement of human secu-
18 See Art., 3, supra note 16. 
19 M. Negrón-Gonzales and M. Contarino, ‘Local Norms Matter: Understanding National Re-
sponses to the Responsibility to Protect’, 2 Global Governance 2014, at 257.
20 UNGA Resolution 60/1 of 24 October 2005, paras. 138-140.
21 Ibid., para. 139.
22 Ibid.
23 See M. Negrón-Gonzales and M. Contarino, supra note 19, at 257.
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rity by the UNGA, pledging to ‘[discuss] and [define] the notion of human se-
curity in the General Assembly.’24 It would appear that the 2005 summit witnessed 
a new momentum in the international community towards recognising the in-
dividual as the ultimate beneficiary of international peace and security rather 
than the state, which is exactly what human security, however it is defined, 
purports to achieve. The overall positive reception of this document25 is a tes-
tament to the general shift in consciousness, but also a reflection of the inevi-
tably cautious framing of the scope of application of R2P.
This link is also important due to the connection of the two concepts, but it 
contains the risk of negative reception due to abounding fears that human 
security may just be R2P bearing a disguise. Countries who manifest a reticence 
towards R2P as a western Trojan horse designed to validate the perpetration 
of western ideals and circumvent the prohibition of interference, may quickly 
feel the same way about human security. The manner in which this notion has 
since been framed is a patent manifestation of these fears.
Does human security already have a basis in international law? Ruti Teitel 
argues that the human security approach has been present in the interna-
tional arena for a number of years, apparent through the ‘normativisation’ of 
conflict, notably the birth of international criminal tribunals after the Second 
World War with the Nuremburg Trials. This phenomenon developed, bringing 
about the ICTR, ICTY, SCSL and ultimately the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) whose mandate is to bring to justice individuals for crimes against hu-
manity, war crimes, genocide and ethnic cleansing. 26 Considering the indi-
vidual as the focus of security concerns, according to Teitel, has been 
transforming the way in which we approach international law, as well as the 
way in which international organisations and bodies such as the UN Security 
Council function.27 Essentially, we are moving away from the understanding of 
security that was originally framed in the UN Charter, based around protecting 
state borders. human security has been proposed as a new way of thinking 
that should take precedence over state security, nevertheless without substitut-
ing it. As Oberleitner posits, there can be ‘no secure state with insecure people 
living in it.’28 Therefore, just behind R2P, human security is creeping into the 
multilateral arena of ‘soft’-international law-making, this time bearing its own 
name.
The most recent illustration of human security making an explicit appearance 
in international law-making is the UNGA Resolution 66/290 entitled ‘follow-up 
to paragraph 143 on human security of the 2005 World Summit Outcome’, 
adopted by consensus on 10 September 2012. According to UNOChA, who 
now hosts the United Nations Trust fund for human Security, ‘This seminal 
achievement marks the first time that the Assembly has agreed on a common 
24 See UNGA R.60/1, supra note 20, para. 143.
25 Only 4 countries Cuba, Nicaragua, Sudan and Venezuela, wanted to re-negotiate the word-
ing, see M. Negrón-Gonzales and M. Contarino, supra note 19, at 258.
26 See R. Teitel, supra note 17.
27 Ibid.
28 See G. Oberleitner, supra note 12, at 190.
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understanding on human security after seven years of discussion. The con-
sensus agreement paves the way to formally apply[ing] human security within 
the work of the United Nations.’29 Conspicuously cautious, the implication of 
this resolution having been adopted by consensus in the universally represen-
tative body of the UN is nonetheless important: whatever the scholarly discus-
sion may have argued regarding the definition or framing of human security, 
this conception has been the product of political agreement and therefore has 
the ‘green light’ for the creation of a legal and political framework. however, 
after this consensual enunciation the international community can discard all 
leanings towards a human security agenda which could, as Teitel posits, offer 
a basis for military or legal intervention.30 This ‘common understanding’31 out-
lines its divergence from R2P, reaffirms state sovereignty in strong terms and 
proposes a basis for international cooperation and support to the end of achiev-
ing human security.Set out in Article 3 of Resolution 66/290, human security is 
first defined as ‘The right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from 
poverty and despair. All individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled 
to freedom from fear and freedom from want […].’32 This is therefore not an 
exhaustive definition but it is notably broad, and as many will be pleased to 
note, endorses the original ‘freedom from fear and freedom from want’ definition 
of the 1994 UNDP report. however it does not allay the fears of those critics 
of human security that deem the concept too broad and idealistic to be opera-
ble.33 
Secondly, and importantly for the ‘operability’ of human security, the Reso-
lution is adamant about the protection of state independence and sovereignty, 
and very strongly distinguishes it from R2P, avoiding the criticism of the coun-
tries that were reticent to this concept.34 Going further, it is stressed that ‘human 
security does not entail the threat or the use of force or coercive measures. 
human security does not replace State security […] human security is based 
on national ownership.’35 The agreed text continues: 
‘Governments retain the primary role and responsibility for ensuring the 
survival, livelihood and dignity of their citizens. The role of the international 
community is to complement and provide the necessary support to Govern-
ments, upon their request, so as to strengthen their capacity to respond to 
current and emerging threats.’ 36 [emphasis added].
Thus this cautious text sets up human security as an international humani-
tarian ideal, rather than an obligation. Those who may have hoped for a ‘hard-
er’ recognition of the concept – or a sign of the discussed ‘waning’ of 
29 UNOCA, ‘human Security at the UN’, available at <http://www.unocha.org/humansecurity/
about-human-security/human-security-un>. 
30 See R. Teitel, supra note 17. 
31 UNGA Resolution 66/290 of 10 September 2012, para. 3.
32 Ibid., para. 3(a).
33 M. Martin, ‘With friends Like These, Who Needs Enemies? human Security and the Chal-
lenge of Effective Multilateralism’, friedrich Ebert Stiftung (2009), at 3. 
34 UNGA Resolution 66/290, para. 3(d).
35 Ibid., para.3(e) (f).
36 Ibid., para. 3(g).
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sovereignty in favour of individual security and solidarity to achieve this – will 
be disappointed. This declaration seems to do all it can to ‘kill off’ human se-
curity as a long-term enforceable international standard.
As part of the international community, the EU is therefore invited to support 
governments ‘upon their request’ to achieve human security. how does the 
EU’s perception of human security fit with this rather tame invitation?
3. hUMAN SECURITY AND ThE EU
having analysed the international legal debate on human security and its most 
recent developments it is useful to analyse the most important policy document 
of the EU on the concept. 
In 2004 the Barcelona Report attempted to place human security in the 
context of the European Security Strategy (ESS). Still the main point of refer-
ence for the EU’s approach, the report outlines the possibility of using human 
security as a basis for the EU’s foreign policy with seven principles for its op-
erationalisation: ‘effective multilateralism,’ a ‘clear political authority,’ a ‘bottom-
up approach,’ the ‘primacy of human rights,’ a ‘regional focus,’ ‘use of legal 
instruments’ and an ‘appropriate use of force.’37 It proposes that the EU should 
endorse and adopt a human security strategy, with the creation of a ‘human 
security response force’ consisting of personnel who would intervene in ‘human 
security missions’ in partner countries.38 While proposing a sound basis for the 
EU’s human security doctrine, the report takes a restrictive view of how it might 
be operationalised by the EU, essentially reflecting the context of the existing 
CSDP missions. The seven principles of human security according to the Bar-
celona report are ostensibly a reflection of the EU’s long-standing internal 
logic, and in this sense do not leave the ‘comfort zone’ of the EU’s existing 
narrative. The question should be asked, as to what extent this agenda fits with 
the EU’s commitment to international law and particularly with human security 
as defined by the UNGA. furthermore, can the EU’s human security stance in 
the context of CSDP be reconciled with the restrictions of Resolution 66/290? 
This raises the question as to why the EU is not taking a much wider approach 
to human security, which would also be relevant in CfSP and in the EU’s foreign 
policy in general?
first of all, the principle of ‘effective multilateralism’ enshrined in the ESS, 
along with the call for the ‘use of legal instruments’ relate directly to the respect 
of international law to which the EU is committed in its external action accord-
ing to article 21 TEU. Therefore, if the EU is to respect its commitment to legal-
ity, international law, and particularly effective multilateralism, it is arguably to 
the definition laid out in UNGA Resolution 66/290 that the EU’s focus should 
shift. The national ownership of human security goals and the responsibility of 
the state are carefully laid out in Resolution 66/290 which deliberately excludes 
the possibility of military or civilian intervention without the invitation of the 
37 See U. Albrecht, supra note 8.
38 See U. Albrecht, supra note 8, at 17.
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government.39 The Resolution instead advocates the notions of development 
of human potential and the individual’s enjoyment of ‘all their rights’, acknowl-
edging an extensive and encompassing human security definition which extends 
to the first, second and third generation of human rights. 
The ‘primacy of human rights’ takes first place on the Barcelona Report’s 
enumeration of human security guidelines. Prima facie an obvious inclusion, 
one might nonetheless question the need to mention that the EU’s personnel 
must endeavour themselves not to breach the human rights of those whose 
human security they are seeking to establish. We trespass into the realms of 
international humanitarian law when discussing collateral damage that may 
result from any kind of intervention, or as the Barcelona Report explains, the 
fact that the ‘personnel deployed on human security missions must avoid killing, 
injury and material destruction.’40 
On the one hand the centrality of human rights to human security is reiter-
ated. however, on closer inspection, pointing out that EU personnel should not 
be breaching human rights highlights the report’s military approach to human 
security. Certainly, in the case of a counter-insurgency operation the preserva-
tion of life, as far as possible, is essential. This stems from and reconfirms, the 
precepts outlined in the Geneva Conventions and protocols, which demand 
humane treatment and protection of civilians in armed conflict, even internal 
conflict.41 
On the other hand, however, it highlights the perception of a division, or 
dichotomy between human security and human rights that is potentially inac-
curate and even unhelpful to the concept of human security. The suggestion 
that the two principles could be incompatible in a practical situation suggests 
that the EU would really be going the wrong way about human security. It is 
the mission-based, interventionist scenario, using a ‘human security force’ to 
promote or re-establish human security when it is lacking. The Barcelona report 
echoes the ESS in acknowledging that ‘the EU is particularly well-equipped for 
[…] multifaceted situations’42 and suggests a holistic approach involving ‘post-
conflict reconstruction’ and ‘nation building.’43 however, the reasoning remains 
entrenched in intervention or ‘mission’ scenarios, whereby the EU’s capacity 
for operational missions must be weighed up against the severity of a security 
threat, and ultimately, the EU must ‘prioritise certain situations over others.’44 
This denies the idea that human security is a much broader goal of a state 
encompassing human rights and, in which daily life free from fear and want is 
possible. It is this ‘state’ of human security that the EU could be looking to 
achieve across all policy areas and by all its relations with third countries, not 
simply by the means of missions.
39 UNGA Resolution 290/66, para. 3(g).
40 See U. Albrecht, supra note 8, at 10.
41 Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 
1949 and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) of 8 June 1977.
42 See U. Albrecht, supra note 8, at 6.
43 Ibid.
44 See U. Albrecht, supra note 8, at 7.
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In order to promote human security more comprehensively in terms of hu-
man development and human rights, the EU could ideally envisage a broader 
framework that would therefore complement more effectively the European 
Security Strategy, both in its commitment to effective multilateralism and more 
broadly the respect of international law. 
This leads to question of a ‘clear political authority’ in a human security mis-
sion, and the creation of a ‘human Security Response force.’ The report pro-
poses that in crisis situations the EU must commit to building and sustaining a 
legitimate political authority. This demonstrates that the EU’s definition of a 
human insecurity situation is necessarily a crisis scenario. The Barcelona Re-
port does not seem to envisage a need for human security which goes beyond 
that of a crisis situation. however, as is emphasized in the UNDP’s conceptu-
alization of this concept, human security is also relevant and must be applied 
in cases where there is no violent threat to livelihood or sudden deterioration 
in the level of security, but where the level of insecurity is constantly low, and 
where the general living conditions are a threat in themselves. This can be 
characterised as the constant presence of insecurity, whereby the numerous 
struggles or fears faced with on an everyday basis amount to a life-threatening 
absence of human security and need to be addressed.
The ‘Bottom-up approach’ laid out in the Barcelona Report supporting the 
notion of local ownership and a thorough context-based approach is com-
pletely keeping with the UNGA conception of human security. The report com-
mits to ‘talking to experts, exiles, civil society groups to discover as accurately 
as possible what people need,’45 which corresponds to the resolution’s asser-
tion that ‘human security requires greater collaboration and partnership among 
governments, international and regional organizations and civil society.’46
Therefore, in terms of rationale, the EU’s agenda as set out in the Barce-
lona Report seems to fit with the concept of human security seen through the 
prism of international law and particularly the UNGA Resolution. Arguably how-
ever, the Barcelona Report did little more than outline principles for the EU 
Security Strategy, justifying, with the premise of a new human security paradigm, 
the deployment of EU missions. This is not the vision that was originally pro-
posed in the 1994 UNDP report, nor the one endorsed by the UNGA in 2012. 
In terms of practical application, the international law framework for human 
security requires a far broader conception than military missions, something 
that the EU is not taking into account.
4. CONCLUSION
human security as a concept is becoming gradually integrated into interna-
tional law through the UN framework and using ‘soft’ instruments. however, 
contrary to and inevitably as a reaction to the notion of Responsibility to Protect, 
it has deliberately been framed to exclude the possibility of intervention. As a 
45 See U. Albrecht, supra note 8, at 13.
46 UNGA Resolution 66/290, para. 3(g).
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whole the international community remains firmly attached to state sovereign-
ty and is not ready to accept that an individual/person-based paradigm could 
override the prerogatives and responsibility of the state in providing human 
security for its own population. 
Resolution 66/290 provided a consensus in 2012 on a broad definition of 
human security which instates the concept as a goal for the international com-
munity to achieve by cooperation and solidarity. Currently the EU’s stance 
reflects the existing context of CSDP in a restrictive understanding of human 
security as a response to crisis via missions. It is therefore important for the 
EU to acknowledge this definition and the consensual stance of the interna-
tional community, emanating from the debate in which it participated. Adopting 
a broad vision of human security which can permeate all areas of foreign 
policy rather than a purely mission-based approach will provide for a legitimate 
and coherent discourse that can be accepted by the international community, 
as well as reflecting the EU’s own commitment to the respect of the principles 
of international law.
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tHE Eu, Human sECuRity and tHE insuLation of tHE Cfsp: 
CompaRing RECEnt poLiCy and judiCiaL tEndEnCiEs
hans Merket
1. INTRODUCTION
‘human security, in its broadest sense, embraces far more than the absence 
of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to 
education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities 
and choices to fulfil his or her potential. Every step in this direction is also a 
step towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing 
conflict’.1 This is how former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, 
one of the most famous advocates of the concept, described human security. 
While the level of conceptualisation and operationalisation is as yet signifi-
cantly lower in the discourse of EU external action, the term nonetheless pops 
up regularly in statements and declarations that try to grasp the complex real-
ity of interconnected human rights, security and development challenges. 
The inherent aim of the concept of human security in EU external policy-
making is to cohere its various strands. The question consequently rises as to 
how it corresponds with and impacts on the EU’s fragmented constitutional and 
institutional framework. This is particularly challenging with regard to the CfSP 
that has so far been deliberately insulated as a distinct, more intergovernmen-
tal, area of action. This is aimed at preventing mutual contamination with the 
‘ever closer’ integration that dominates the EU legal order as a whole.2 Yet, 
this delimitation erects quite a number of obstacles that complicate the Union’s 
efforts towards coherence and comprehensiveness. Given that the widely por-
trayed objective of the Lisbon Treaty reforms is to streamline the EU’s external 
action framework, the expectation of an enhanced human security outcome of 
its diverse external toolbox rises. 
In this light, the present contribution will explore the EU institutions’ policy 
rhetoric on human security and subsequently analyse the legal complexity of 
its inherent coherence rationale. By studying and contrasting some recent 
policy and judicial tendencies we will subsequently unravel the progress, chal-
lenges and potential of the EU to transcend the insulation of the CfSP for the 
benefit of a comprehensive security approach.
1 K. Annan Secretary-General Salutes International Workshop on human Security in Mon-
golia, Two-Day
Session in Ulaanbaatar, Press Release SG/SM/7382, 8-10.05.2000. 
2 Art., 1 Treaty on the European Union 2009 (TEU).
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2. ThE EU’S hUMAN SECURITY LExICON
Understanding the scope, meaning and implications of the human security 
concept in the context of EU external action is not a straightforward exercise. 
The central document is the Barcelona Report of 2004 establishing ‘A human 
Security Doctrine for Europe’. This report was commissioned by high Repre-
sentative Solana and drawn up by a group of distinguished practitioners and 
academics. It aims at better understanding how effect could be given to the 
European Security Strategy – notably a document that in itself does not refer 
to the concept of human security.3 The Barcelona report conceptualises human 
security in broad terms as ‘the freedom for individuals from basic insecurities 
caused by gross human rights violations’.4 It contains some notable ideas such 
as a set of principles to guide EU actions in situations of severe insecurity, a 
15,000-men strong ‘human Security Response force’ and a new legal frame-
work for interventions. Yet, the report remains largely theoretical and leaves 
readers in the dark as to the practical implication of this so-called ‘doctrine’. 
The 2007 follow-up Madrid report, entitled ‘A European Way of Security’, 
aims to tackle this operational void with a number of concrete instructions. 
These are based on six human security principles: the primacy of human rights, 
legitimate political authority, a bottom-up approach, effective multilateralism, 
an integrated regional approach and a clear and transparent strategic direction.5 
however, it can still hardly be seen as a satisfactory policy guide. The report 
describes human security as the term ‘that best fits what Europe already does, 
what its ambitions are and the unique mix of its abilities to deliver this vision’.6 
This is stated to be ‘about helping people to feel safe in their homes and on 
the streets as well as ensuring they have what they need to live on’.7 from 
this it draws that distinctions between security, development and human rights 
are misleading, but paradoxically limits instructions solely to the CfSP and the 
CSDP.8 It therefore seems that, rather than a uniting policy vision, ‘[i]nternal 
pressure on the EU to articulate and justify its foreign policy ambitions, and to 
supply a narrative for the ESDP, became the strongest driver of a human se-
curity agenda’.9
One should furthermore not forget that these reports are only research 
endeavours and their impact can only be measured by the extent that their 
3 Council of the European Union, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security 
Strategy’, European Security Strategy (December 2003) available at <https://www.consilium.eu
ropa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>.
4 Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, ‘The Barcelona Report: A human Security 
Doctrine for Europe’, Presented to EU high Representative for CfSP Javier Solana (Barcelona, 
September 2004), at 5.
5 human Security Study Group, ‘The Madrid Report: A European Way of Security’ (Madrid, 
November.2007), 15-19.
6 Ibid., at 8.
7 Ibid. 
8 Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the CSDP was named the European Secu-
rity and Defence Policy (ESDP).
9 M. Martin and T. Owen, ‘The Second Generation of human Secuirty: Lessons from the UN 
and EU Experience’ 86 International Affairs 2010, at 219.
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conclusions are rhetorically used and practically applied by EU institutions and 
Member States. In this sense it is telling that the call in the Madrid Report on 
Member States to ‘agree a public declaration of their commitment to principles 
which put human Security at the heart of the European Union’s external op-
erations’ was never realised.10 Nonetheless, the terminology stayed and regu-
larly appears in EU policy statements. Yet, at no point is a definition of human 
security provided, so we can only deduct its meaning from the manner and 
context in which it is used. 
The Commission has been the main champion of the term as a manner to 
rivet EU development cooperation to the broader framework of EU foreign 
policy.11 The pivot in this undertaking was External Relations Commissioner 
ferrero-Waldner who regularly proposed a holistic concept of human security. 
In line with the EU’s oft-recurring philosophy that neither security or develop-
ment are ‘possible without an adequate level of the other’, she called ‘to put 
people, their human rights and the threats that they face at the centre of our 
policies’.12 Yet, this remained very much a personal pet project that ended with 
her mandate. further policy references to human security are all but system-
atic. It is briefly mentioned, as if it were a clear and well-defined policy concept, 
in the 2010 revision of the Cotonou agreement and the 2006 European Con-
sensus on Development, respectively as an element of peace-building and 
conflict prevention, and of eradicating poverty.13 Slightly more extensive, the 
2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy concre-
tises that efforts to build human security have been taken ‘by reducing pov-
erty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting 
development, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity’.14 
While human security thus never formed the subject of an overarching and 
explanatory policy document, it has nonetheless became part of the EU’s jargon. 
Rather than immediate operational use, its main contribution appears to consist 
of giving a name to a security paradigm based on the individual and his human 
rights, rather than the state’s security perspective.15 As Martin and Owen put 
it ‘[a]s a concept, it informs everything but, at the same time, has no regula-
10 See Madrid Report (2007), supra note 5, at 7.
11 for instance: Commission Communication (COM(2003)615) on Governance and Devel-
opment, 20.10.2003, 8; Commission Communication (COM(2006)601) on Strategy for Africa: 
An EU regional political partnership for peace, security and development in the Horn of Africa, 
20.10.2006, at 11.
12 B. ferrero-Waldner, ‘The EU’s role in protecting Europe’s security’, Address to conference 
on ‘Protecting Europe: Policies for enhancing security in the European Union’ (Brussels May 
2006), at 3. 
13 Art., 11 consolidated version of the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement 2000, revised in Lux-
embourg on 25 June 2005 and in Ouagadougou on 22 June 2010, O.J. [2010] L 287, 04.11.2010; 
Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States 
meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union 
Development Policy, ‘The European Consensus on Development’, OJ [2006] C46/1, 24.02.2006, 
para. 11.
14 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a 
Changing World (Brussels, S407/08) (December 2008), at 2.
15 J.h. Matlary, ‘Much Ado About Little: the EU and human Security’, 84 International Affairs 
2008, at 142.
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tory power or operational traction, merely serving to pad out a pantheon of 
worthy aims’.16 Nevertheless, some common elements are implicit in EU poli-
cy references to human security. Aimed at better mainstreaming human rights 
in EU external action, it is part of an approach that seeks to bundle the variety 
of EU policies and instruments across long-term cooperation and short-term 
interventions, in order to arrive at a coherent policy design that better exploits 
the potential of this diversity.
In this manner the adherence to human security fits into the EU’s long-
standing efforts to break ‘the vicious cycle of poverty, war, environmental deg-
radation and failing economic, social and political structures’.17 Even though 
these mutually destructive forces of socio-economic deterioration and violence 
are well-known, the EU continues to struggle with turning them in a constructive 
policy guide. Since the late 1990s we have witnessed a go-and-fro of new 
concepts having their go at trying to catch this complex reality: from structural 
stability over root causes of conflict,18 conflict prevention,19 linking relief reha-
bilitation and development (LRRD),20 human security, a security-development 
nexus,21 failed states22 to fragility.23 The EU’s struggle to turn words into deeds 
is most clearly evidenced by the continued failure of institutions to adopt the 
Action Plans on Security and Development and on Situations of fragility that 
were already announced in 2007 in order to give practical effect to its policy 
rhetoric.24 Despite repeated reminders from the OECD, the European Parlia-
ment and the Commission,25 and even a recent reiteration of this endeavour 
by the Council,26 these plans appear to be shelved at present in the absence 
of political sponsorship.
16 Martin and Owen (2010) op.cit. note 9, at 223.
17 European Consensus on Development (2006), available at <http://ec.europa.eu/develop
ment/icenter/repository/european_consensus_2005_en.pdf>, para. 37. 
18 Commission Communication (COM(1996)332) on the European Union and the Issue of 
Conflicts in Africa: Peace-building, Conflict Prevention and Beyond, 06.03.1996, at 2.
19 Presidency Conclusions, ‘EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts’ (Göteborg 
European Council) (June 2001), at 3.
20 Commission Communication (COM(2001)153) on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Devel-
opment – An assessment, 23.04.2001, at 23.
21 Council Conclusions on Security and Development (2831st External Relations Council 
Meeting, Brussels), 19-20.11.2007.
22 See Council (2003), supra note 3, at 6.
23 Council Conclusions on an EU Response to Situations of fragility (2831st External Rela-
tions Council Meeting, Brussels), 19-20.11.2007.
24 Council Conclusions on Security and Development (2007) op.cit. note 21, para. 15; Council 
Conclusions on an EU Response to Situations of fragility (2007) op.cit. note 23, para. 16. 
25 Respectively, DAC, Peer Review: European Union (Development Assistance Committee, 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Paris, 2012) 33-34; Euro-
pean Parliament, ‘EU Development Cooperation in fragile States: Challenges and Opportunities’, 
DG for External Policies of the Union (June 2013), at 7; Commission Staff Working Document 
(SEC(2010)421) Policy Coherence for Development Work Programme 2010-2013 (April 2010), 
at 34.
26 Council Conclusions on C (Education, Youth, Culture and Sport Council Meeting, Brussels, 
25-26.11.2013, para. 8.
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3. ThE LEGAL COMPLExITY Of COhERENCE
further compounding the general complexity of overcoming the departmen-
talisation and compartmentalisation of foreign policy for the EU is the treaty-
based distinction that separates the CfSP from all other external policies. The 
latter are set out in the Treaty on the functioning of the EU (TfEU) and by 
default apply the ordinary legislative procedure, implying a formal proposal of 
the Commission and co-decision by the European Parliament (EP) and the 
Council (voting by qualified majority), with full judicial competence of the EU 
Court of Justice (CJEU). The CfSP on the other hand, is the only policy area 
excluded from the TfEU and governed by specific rules and procedures set 
out in Article 24(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). These are domi-
nated by the Council, that decides by unanimity, and accord only very limited 
roles to the Commission, the Parliament and the CJEU. This makes efforts to 
align and integrate EU external policies legally complex as it requires difficult 
choices of legal basis between divided policy toolboxes. At the same time, it 
raises administrative challenges as these choices have to be made across very 
distinct policy-making communities. These are moreover politically sensitive 
as they affect the division of competences and balance of power between the 
EU institutions and with the Member States. 
This complexity has certainly not stopped policy activity in the grey areas 
between the competences of development cooperation, CfSP, humanitarian 
aid, etc. EU institutions have developed an impressive institutional machinery 
and range of instruments, including innovative financial tools such as the Instru-
ment contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP – the previous Instrument for 
Stability) and the African Peace facility (APf).27 The variety of instruments has 
been a blessing as well as a curse. On the one hand, the EU has the great 
advantage of a comprehensive reach, meaning that there are few areas re-
lated to human security that it cannot address. On the other hand, coordinating 
this diversity of actions is all but a self-evident undertaking, not the least because 
this constantly runs up against the legal, institutional and policy divide between 
the CfSP and the other (TfEU) external policies. 
Whereas challenges such as insecurity, poverty and human rights violations 
are ruthlessly cross-cutting, the Union’s means to cut across the legal divide 
between the policy areas that address them are thus limited. This has resulted 
in considerable fragmentation (with all the EU’s external financing instruments28 
and increasingly CSDP missions accorded a role in the elastic field of security 
27 Regulation (230/2014) of 11 March 2014 establishing an instrument contributing to stability 
and peace, OJ [2014] L77/1, 15.03.2014; Art. 12, Council Regulation (617/2007/EC) of 14 May 
2007 on the implementation of the 10th European Development Fund under the ACP-EC Partner-
ship Agreement, O.J.[2007] L152/1, 16.06.2007 (currently transitory arrangements are in place 
before the Internal Agreement on the 11th EDf enters into force). 
28 for 2014-2020 these are the European Development fund, the Instrument for Pre-acces-
sion Assistance (IPA), the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), the Development Coop-
eration Instrument (DCI), the Partnership Instrument (PI), the Instrument contributing to Stability 
and Peace (IcSP) and the European Instrument for Democracy & human Rights (EIDhR).
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sector reform),29 duplication (with the EU Court of Auditors recently denouncing 
the existence of three separate situation monitoring entities within the External 
Action Service (EEAS), the Commission and the Council General Secretariat)30 
and occasional inter-institutional tensions. The most infamous example of the 
latter was a competence battle between the Council and the Commission, which 
ended up before the EU Court of Justice, on the appropriateness of Council 
Decision 2004/833/CfSP providing support to the Economic Community of 
West-African States (ECOWAS) to deal with the calamitous spread of small 
arms and light weapons (SALW).31 The Commission contested the legality of 
this Decision and held that such activity had to be adopted within the framework 
of the Community’s development cooperation policy.32 
The Court’s standard refrain is that the choice of legal basis must be found-
ed on objective factors amenable to judicial review, which it finds in the mea-
sure’s predominant aim and content.33 In pre-Lisbon cross-pillar cases the 
Court added ex Article 47 TEU (current Article 40 TEU) to this centre-of-grav-
ity test, which stated that nothing in TEU ‘shall affect the Treaties establishing 
the European Communities’. It interpreted this as ‘hierarchical delimitation rule’, 
meaning that second (and third) pillar measures could not ‘encroach’ on Euro-
pean Community (EC) competences.34 This was considered the case if these 
measures could have been adopted on an EC legal basis. In the ECOWAS 
case the Court’s aim and content analysis led to the conclusion that the Deci-
sion contained intricately linked development and CfSP components, without 
one being incidental to the other. Because it considered that ex Article 47 TEU, 
allegedly as a principle, prevented a combined legal basis, preference had to 
be given to the Community and the CfSP decision was to be annulled.35 
The details of this controversial case have been discussed elsewhere and 
well.36 for the purposes of this paper it is important to note that the price for 
this gained clarity regarding competence distribution appeared to be paid in 
terms of policy coherence. In explaining why it found that tackling the spread 
29 h. Merket, ‘The EU and the Security-Development Nexus: Bridging the Legal Divide’, 18 
(Special Issue) European Foreign Affairs Review 2013, 88-89.
30 European Court of Auditors, ‘The Establishment of the European External Action Service’, 
Special Report No.11 (November 2014), para. 56 and box 2.
31 Council Decision (2004/833/CfSP) of 2 December 2004 implementing Joint Action 
2002/589/CFSP with a view to a European Union contribution to ECOWAS in the framework of 
the Moratorium on Small Arms and Light Weapons, O.J.[2004] L359/65, 04.12.2004.
32 ECJ, Case C-91/05 European Commission v. Council of the European Union (ECOWAS or 
Small Arms and Light Weapons) [2008] ECR I-3651.
33 ECJ, Case C-45/86 European Commission v. Council of the European Union [1987] ECR 
I-1517, para. 11.
34 P. Van Elsuwege, ‘EU External Action after the Collapse of the Pillar Structure: in Search 
of a New Balance between Delimitation and Consistency’,47 Common Market Law Review 2010, 
at 1002.
35 See Case C-91/05, supra note 32, paras. 75−76 and 109−110.
36 C. hillion and R.A. Wessel, ‘Competence Distribution in EU External Relations after 
ECOWAS: Clarification or Continued fuzziness?’, 46 Common Market Law Review 2009, 551-
586; P. Van Elsuwege, ‘On the Boundaries between the European Union’s first Pillar and Second 
Pillar: a Comment on the ECOWAS Judgment of the European Court of Justice’, 15 Columbia 
Journal of European Law 2009, 531-548.
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of SALW also constituted an objective of EU development cooperation, the 
Court referred to the European Consensus on Development and the preamble 
of the contested CfSP decision, as both documents note that insecurity re-
duces the prospects for sustainable development.37 Diametrically opposed to 
the grand rhetoric of policy coherence, this ruling thus discouraged the Coun-
cil from including cross-references to development issues in future CfSP leg-
islation.
Such tensions, as well as the fragmentation and duplication of policy struc-
tures and initiatives, illustrate the need for guidelines, instructions and a con-
sensual division of labour on how to connect the whole range of EU external 
actions that impact on human security. Only in this manner can the Union 
maximise positive connections and avoid counterproductive action. In essence 
this touches upon the sensitive issue of competence boundaries, which explains 
why – yet does not make it any more acceptable – EU institutions and Member 
States only seem to be able to find consensus in a rather generic call for more 
coherence and coordination. 
4. BETTER PROSPECTS AhEAD? NEW POLICY TENDENCIES IN ThE 
POST-LISBON TREATY fRAMEWORK
The Lisbon Treaty has streamlined the Union’s external action architecture in 
a way that ostensibly brings it more in line with the commitment to cohere and 
align its various external policies. This is most visible in the formal abolition of 
the pillar structure and the dissolution of the European Community into the 
EU.38 Moreover, all the external action objectives are now grouped together in 
a single Article 21 TEU. This expresses an explicit commitment to pursue these 
objectives in all ‘the different areas of the Union’s external action’, ‘work for a 
high degree of cooperation’ and ensure consistency between them.39 At the 
same time the distinct status of the CfSP has survived the Treaty changes. 
This is most clearly embodied in Article 40 TEU. The latter accords its prede-
cessor (ex Article 47 TEU) a Janus-face by setting up mutual lines of defence 
and preventing the implementation of both CfSP and TfEU competences from 
affecting each others’ procedures and institutional balance. The inherent para-
dox of the Lisbon Treaty is thus that its stronger plea for coherence simultane-
ously complicates efforts to respect the strictly-guarded delimitation of 
competences. 
Yet, importantly, the Lisbon Treaty provides new means to deal with this 
complexity it the form of three well-known institutional adaptations and innova-
tions. first, there is the triple-hatted high Representative (hR) who combines 
the functions of conducting the CfSP, presiding over the foreign Affairs Coun-
37 See Case C-91/05, supra note 32, paras. 66 and 93.
38 Art., 1 TEU.
39 See further: P. Van Elsuwege and h. Merket, ‘The Role of the Court of Justice in Ensuring 
the Unity of the EU’s External Representation’ in S. Blockmans and R.A. Wessel (eds), ‘Principles 
and Practices of EU External Representation’, 5 CLEER Working Papers 2012, 40-43, available 
at <http://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/20120911T102448-cleer2012-5book_web.pdf>.
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cil (fAC) and ensuring consistency of the Union’s external action as Vice-
President of the Commission.40 The leitmotiv under each of these three functions 
is to better interlink the various dimensions of EU foreign policy.41 This provides 
her/him the legal mandate that, combined with the necessary political clout, 
could ensure much-needed leadership over EU external action as a whole, and 
its human security aspects more specifically. This integrative function trickles 
down further to the EEAS, that is assigned to assist the hR under each of her 
three hats. This is mirrored in the fact that it is composed of staff transferred 
from the Commission, the General Secretariat of the Council and the Member 
States’ diplomatic services.42 This bundling of competences is in turn trans-
lated to the field by transforming the old Commission Delegations into EU 
Delegations that represent the entire range of EU competences.
following a period of teething troubles,43 these new institutions appear to 
have started signing up to their integrative mandates. Three recent policy ten-
dencies illustrate this gradual shift. first, there is the increasingly strategic and 
regionally-oriented policy approach that is mainly put forth by the EEAS. This 
is substantiated in strategic frameworks for the Sahel, the horn of Africa, the 
African Great Lakes and the Gulf of Guinea, as well as thematic strategies such 
as the one for maritime security.44 In the light of the EU’s difficulties with setting 
up a comprehensive policy guide – be it for human security, the security-de-
velopment nexus or fragility – these strategies provide more practically-orient-
ed alternatives, that moreover allow better responsiveness and alignment with 
the local context. 
Second, with ups and downs,45 these changes to the Union’s institutional 
structure appear to be gradually contributing to better inter-institutional relations. 
A good example of the latter are two interesting guidance notes from November 
2013 that were drawn up jointly by the Commission and the EEAS: one on 
‘Addressing conflict prevention, peace-building and security issues under ex-
ternal cooperation instruments’ and another on ‘the use of Conflict analysis in 
support of EU external action’. Notably, these documents stimulate a bottom-up 
approach to better inform EEAS and Commission staff, so as to enable them 
to establish the right mix of instruments, adapted to the specific challenges of 
40 Art., 18 TEU.
41 See particularly Arts. 18(4), 21(3), 26(2), 16(6) and 32 TEU.
42 Art., 27(3) TEU and Art., 6(9) Council Decision (2010/427/EU) Establishing the Organi-
sation and Functioning of the European External Action Service [2010] O.J.[2010] L201/30, 
3.8.2010 (further: ‘EEAS Decision’). for a more elaborate analysis: h. Merket, ‘The European 
External Action Service and the Nexus between CfSP/CSDP and Development Cooperation’, 17 
European Foreign Affairs Review 2012, 625-652.
43 Some examples: A. Willis, ‘Ashton to face tough questions from EU ministers’, EUOb-
server.com, 20 May 2011; T. Vogel, ‘A year on, and still failing’, European Voice, 5 January 2012.
44 EEAS, ‘Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel’ (September 2011); Council 
of the European Union, ‘A Strategic framework for the horn of Africa’, 3124th Foreign Affairs 
Council meeting (November 2011); Commission and high Representative Joint Communication 
(JOIN(2013)23) A Strategic framework for the Great Lakes Region, 19.06.2013; Council, ‘EU 
Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea’, 3324th Foreign Affairs Council Meeting (March 2014); Council 
(11205/14) European Union Maritime Security Strategy, 24.06.2014.
45 See for instance: A. Rettman, ‘Staff leaving EU diplomatic service amid bad working condi-
tions’, EUObserver.com, 30 September 2011.
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each situations.46 In a symbolic sign of burying the hatchet of inter-institutional 
tensions, the Commission and the EEAS agreed on a division of labour regard-
ing SALW control. ‘[I]ssues having a primarily military/security dimension need 
to be addressed under the CfSP budget’, while ‘all other dimensions of SALW 
at country level such as the legal and regulatory frameworks, institutional ca-
pacity-building, including some trade-related aspects … , awareness raising, 
survey activities, etc.’ can be addressed by external cooperation instruments.47
A third recent policy fad is the EU’s comprehensive approach to external 
conflicts and crises. This was first concretised in a long-awaited Joint Com-
munication from the high Representative and the Commission in December 
2013 and endorsed by the Council in May 2014.48 Adapted to the refurbished 
external action system of the Lisbon Treaty, the specificity of this new approach 
is that it aims to be ‘both a general working method and a set of concrete 
measures and processes to improve how the EU, based on a common strate-
gic vision and drawing on its wide array of existing tools and instruments, col-
lectively can develop, embed and deliver more coherent and more effective 
policies, working practices, actions and results’.49 In what might incite feelings 
of déjà-vu, the Council again commits to give effect to this new agenda by 
adopting an Action Plan before April 2015. It would be very damaging to the 
Union’s credibility if this became another ghost plan haunting the EU corridors.50 
5. IS ThE COURT ON BOARD? 
The Lisbon Treaty significantly shakes up the legal foundations that lay at the 
basis of the ECOWAS-ruling. While Article 40 TEU makes the hierarchical 
delimitation approach difficult to uphold, Article 21 TEU obscures the future of 
the traditional aim-and-content test. Not only does the latter group together all 
external objectives, it also deprives the CfSP, as the only EU policy field, of 
its own specific aims. In the absence of a worthy follower for the ECOWAS-case 
in a post-Lisbon setting, analysts grasp in the dark regarding the Court’s ap-
proach towards these Treaty changes. Three recent cases, that are chosen in 
the present contribution because of their relevance for human and comprehen-
sive security, give some preliminary indications of how the new CfSP-TfEU 
balance might be struck. Without going into details, this section will extract 
46 EEAS and Commission, ‘Guidance note the use of Conflict analysis in support of EU ex-
ternal action, n.d., available at <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/public-fragility/document/guid
ance-note-conflict-analysis-support-eu-external-action>. 
47 EEAS and Commission, ‘Addressing conflict prevention, peace-building and security issues 
under external cooperation instruments’ n.d., at 7, available at <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.
eu/public-fragility/document/addressing-conflict-prevention-peace-building-and-security-issues-
under-external-cooperation>.
48 Commission and high Representative Joint Communication (JOIN(2013)30) The EU’s 
comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises, 11.12.2013.
49 Council Conclusions on the EU’s comprehensive approach (3312th foreign Affairs Council 
meeting) 12.05.2014, para. 2.
50 A. Sherriff and V. hauck, ‘Will the Action Plan to Implement the EU’s Comprehensive Ap-
proach have Any Bite?’, ECDPM Talking Points Blog, 23.05.2014.
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some general tendencies that are relevant for understanding the role and po-
sition of the CfSP in the current legal order. 
first, case C-130/10 Parliament v. Council concerned the appropriate legal 
basis for restrictive measures directed against natural or legal persons.51 Of 
particular relevance here is that this concerned the first post-Lisbon ruling 
wherein the Court was called to shed light on the scope of the CfSP. Given 
that the Treaty no longer assigns the latter specific objectives, Advocate-Gen-
eral Bot proposed to detract Article 21(2)(a) to (c) from the common listing as 
these ‘are in essence the same as those assigned to the CfSP under [ex] 
Article 11(1) TEU’.52 Not only is such an interpretation contrary to the letter and 
spirit of Article 21 TEU, it also represents a distorted reality. In fact, under the 
previous Treaty framework the CfSP already shared the aim of Article 21(2)
(b) to consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law and human rights 
with EU development cooperation as well as economic, financial and technical 
cooperation with third countries.53 
Whereas the Court circumvents this delicate question, it provides certain 
indications that the Lisbon Treaty indeed tore down the narrow CfSP walls that 
lay at the basis of the ECOWAS case. first, it makes clear that the new scope 
of the CfSP is a broad one that, in line with Article 24(1) TEU, covers ‘all areas 
of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security’ and aims to 
counter threats to peace and international security.54 Second, as in the ECOW-
AS case, the Court ruled out the possibility of a combined CfSP-TfEU legal 
basis, yet, no longer as a principle but in so far as the respective procedures 
are incompatible.55 This suggests that the CJEU no longer submits the CfSP 
to separate rules of delimitation, but applies its general methodology regarding 
the choice of legal basis. Third, while the Court does not accept the invitation 
put forth by both the Council and the Advocate General to draw in Article 40 
TEU, its ruling nonetheless appears to convey its rationale. As accurately put 
by hillion, the Court’s ‘interest in various CfSP provisions … materializes the 
protective and implicit interpretative jurisdiction over the CfSP which it is en-
dowed with on the basis of Article 40(2) TEU’.56 
A second case of interest is C-377/12 Commission v. Council on the ap-
propriate legal basis of a framework Agreement on Partnership and Coopera-
51 ECJ, Case C-130/10 European Parliament v. Council of the European Union [2012] ECR 
I-00000 nyr. for an extensive analysis: A. Ott, ‘Case Note on Case C-130/10 European Parlia-
ment v. Council of the European Union’, 19 Maastricht Journal in European and Comparative 
Law 2012, 589-594; G. De Baere, ‘from ‘Don’t Mention the Titanium Dioxide Judgment’ to ‘I Men-
tioned it Once, But I Think I Got Away with it All Right’: Reflections on the Choice of Legal Basis 
in EU External Relations after the Legal Basis for Restrictive Measures Judgment’, 15 Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies 2013, 537-562.
52 See Case C-130/10, supra note 51, Opinion of AG Bot, 31.01.2012, para. 63.
53 Ex Arts. 177(2) and 181a(1) TEC. 
54 See Case C-130/10, supra note 51, paras. 62-63.
55 Ibid., paras. 47-49. In para. 73 the CJEU moreover indicates that such incompatibility does 
not arise in all combinations with a CfSP legal bases. 
56 C. hillion, ‘fighting Terrorism Through the Common foreign and Security Policy’ in I. Gov-
aere and S. Poli (eds), EU Management of Global Emergencies: Legal Framework for Combating 
Threats and Crises (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff 2014), at 86.
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tion between the EU and the Republic of the Philippines. here it was the 
Commission that sought the annulment of the Council Decision on the signing 
of the agreement.57 It considered that the legal bases of development coop-
eration and the common commercial policy covered the whole agreement, and 
therefore the addition by the Council of legal bases relating to readmission, 
transport and the environment was illegal. Building further on case C-268/94 
Portugal v Council58 the Court embraced a particularly wide view of develop-
ment cooperation that is ‘conducted in the framework of a wide range of policy 
objectives which pursue the development of the third country concerned, so 
that development cooperation agreements necessarily encompass a wide range 
of specific areas of cooperation’.59 Key is that the CJEU bases this broad view 
on the unified list of external action aims in the TEU, meaning that ‘the field of 
development cooperation is not limited to measures directly aimed at the erad-
ication of poverty, but also pursues the objectives referred to in Article 21(2) 
TEU’.60
A similar approach was taken by Advocate-General Bot in Case C-658/11 
Parliament v. Council.61 In this case the European Parliament contested the 
exclusive CfSP nature of Council Decision 2011/640/CfSP on the signing and 
conclusion of the agreement between the EU and the Republic of Mauritius 
regarding the conditions of transfer of suspected pirates captured by the CSDP 
naval operation ATALANTA.62 The Parliament argued that the agreement, in 
view of its aim and content, also relates to judicial cooperation in criminal mat-
ters, police cooperation and development cooperation. The Advocate-General 
starts his detailed analysis with the observation that this case once again dem-
onstrates ‘that despite the formal disappearance of the pillars the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon has not obviated the need to delimit the respective 
scopes of the Union’s different policies’.63 he notes that this is a delicate task 
when the objective of security is at stake because the well-recognised inter-
relationship with development and human rights ‘means that it would very often 
be possible to argue that measures taken in one of these three areas will also 
have some effect on the other two areas’.64 Again basing himself on Article 21 
TEU the Advocate-General argues that ‘[t]he requirement of consistency en-
57 Council Decision (2012/272/EU) on the signing, on behalf of the Union, of the Frame-
work Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between the European Union and its Member 
States, of the one part, and the Republic of the Philippines, of the other part, OJ [2012] L134/3, 
24.05.2012.
58 ECJ, Case C-268/94 Portugal v. Council of the European Union [1996] ECR I – 6208.
59 ECJ, Case C-377/12 European Commission v. Council of the European Union [2014] nyr, 
para. 18.
60 Ibid., paras. 36-37.
61 ECJ, Case C-658/11 European Parliament v. Council of the European Union [2014] nyr. 
62 Council Decision (2011/640/CfSP) on the signing and conclusion of the Agreement be-
tween the European Union and the Republic of Mauritius on the conditions of transfer of sus-
pected pirates and associated seized property from the European Union-led naval force to the 
Republic of Mauritius and on the conditions of suspected pirates after transfer, OJ [2011] L 254/1, 
30.09.2011.
63 See Case C-658/11, supra note 61, Opinion of Advocate-General Bot, 30.01.2014, 
para. 2.
64 Ibid., para. 3 and 23.
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courages the Council to integrate aspects relating to other Union policies into 
the CfSP measures which it adopts’. Yet, this does not ‘nullify the particularities 
of each of the Union’s policies, just as their complementarity does not nullify 
the specific nature of each policy’.65
These cases therefore provide some preliminary evidence for Van Vooren’s 
suggestion that Article 21 TEU ‘raises the threshold’ of when the Court’s centre-
of gravity reasoning will conclude that additional objectives of a certain measure 
are central rather than incidental.66 This could point to an inclination of the ju-
diciary to allow more discretion to the decision-making level when choosing an 
appropriate legal basis. Unfortunately, the Court shied away from this question 
and limited its ruling in case C-658/11 to a rather technical – but also very 
welcome – clarification of Article 218 TfEU. The latter is a major novelty of the 
new external action framework as it introduces a single procedure for all inter-
national agreements concluded by the Union, including the CfSP – albeit with 
differentiated rules. Noteworthy is that the Court again does not submit the 
CfSP to a specific legal regime, but explains that the differentiation within this 
unified procedure is on a general level ‘designed to reflect externally the divi-
sion of powers between institutions that applies internally’.67 In line with this 
more normalised position for the CfSP within the EU’s current legal order, the 
CJEU moreover makes the case that exclusive CfSP agreements cannot be 
entirely exempt from judicial and democratic scrutiny. Indeed, the Court’s con-
sidered its exclusion from the CfSP as a derogation that should be interpreted 
narrowly.68 The obligation under Article 218(10) TfEU, on the other hand, that 
the Parliament ‘shall be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the 
procedure’ was to be interpreted broadly.69 
6. CONCLUSION
Even though never extensively conceptualised, the EU’s policy references to 
human security fit into the long-standing efforts to cohere its various external 
policy strands, including CfSP, CSDP, development cooperation, humanitarian 
aid, etc. These often founder at the rock of institutional and constitutional frag-
mentation, which is most outspoken in the delimitation of the CfSP. A number 
of recent policy trends indicates that the Lisbon Treaty’s efforts to soften this 
65 Ibid., para. 24.
66 B. Van Vooren, ‘The Small Arms Judgment in an Age of Constitutional Turmoil’, 14 Euro-
pean Foreign Affairs Review 2009, at 246.
67 See Case C-658/11, supra note 61, para. 55.
68 Ibid., 73.
69 Ibid., 75-87. Whereas the CJEU did in this case not agree with the Parliament on the sub-
ject that the Decision at issue could not be adopted exclusively under the CfSP, it appears that 
the latter is trying its luck again in case C-263/12 (Parliament v. Council). In a remarkably similar 
manner the Parliament argues here that Decision 2014/198/CfSP on the signing and conclusion 
of the Agreement between the EU and Tanzania on the conditions of transfer of suspected pirates 
and associated seized property from ATALANTA is invalid because it does not relate exclusively 
to the CfSP, but also contains elements of judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police 
cooperation. 
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fragmentation gradually start to bear fruit for a more streamlined foreign policy 
approach. These consist of the EEAS policy guidance in adopting regionally-
oriented strategic frameworks, inter-institutional efforts to improve the mix of 
available instruments and the new commitment to a comprehensive security 
approach.
There is however still a long way to go, as made clear by three recent inter-
institutional disputes on division of competences in external relations that were 
brought before the Court. All three cases relate to human or comprehensive 
security: case C-130/10 about terrorism and threats to international security; 
case 377/12 about a cooperation agreement with the Philippines that contains 
elements of development, environmental protection, migration and readmission; 
and case C-658/11 about the fight against piracy, the rule of law and the human 
rights of suspected pirates. Notably, in none of these cases EU institutions 
disagreed on the substance of the measure at issue, but only disputed the 
choice of legal basis. This painfully illustrates how EU decision-makers agree 
about the general idea of interlinking development, security and human rights 
policies, but not on the modalities or outcome of this interlinkage. This not only 
risks to undermine inter-institutional trust but also the EU’s external credibility. 
As long as there is no internal EU agreement on how to give practical effect to 
its widely portrayed coherence rationale, the optimal use of its scarce resourc-
es can hardly be ensured.
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Csdp CRisis managEmEnt opERations – BEtwEEn Human 
sECuRity and tHE ‘CompREHEnsivE appRoaCH’
Monica Oproiu1
INTRODUCTION
The violent disintegration of the federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1990s 
is generally regarded as being linked to the failure of the European Union’s 
(EU) prevention efforts undertaken in the framework of the Common foreign 
and Security Policy (CfSP). The wars in Croatia, Bosnia and herzegovina and 
later Kosovo thus represented the main driver behind the Member States’ 
decision to develop an EU ‘autonomous capacity for action’ on the interna-
tional stage. The creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 
illustrated the EU’s ambitions in the security realm. The prospect of a spill-over 
from violent ethno-political conflict has been a strong incentive for the Euro-
pean Union to engage in the stabilisation of the Western Balkans. The lessons 
learned there shaped the EU’s crisis management operations and helped es-
tablish links between its security concerns and various policy frameworks for 
engaging third countries.
The EU inaugurated the ESDP in 2003 by deploying military and civilian 
operations in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM) and Bos-
nia and herzegovina. In both cases the EU took over from NATO the task of 
stabilising the country affected by ethnic strife through a military presence on 
the ground, doubled by police reform. In 2006-2008 the number of EU crisis 
management operations peaked, the majority of them being civilian. The eco-
nomic and financial crisis which started in 2008 caused a slowdown in deploy-
ments and after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009 there were no new 
missions for two years. In 2011 the EU began deploying again, this time focus-
ing on Africa, especially in the Sahel and the horn of Africa. 
The sometimes parallel evolution of the operational and strategic levels of 
the security and defence policy2 made EU deployments dependent on the 
1 Postdoctoral Researcher within the Department of International Relations and European 
Integration, the National School of Political Studies and Public Administration (NSPSPA), Bu-
charest (Romania). Beneficiary of the project “Doctoral and postdoctoral scholarships for young 
researchers in the fields of Political Sciences, Administrative Sciences, Communication Sciences 
and Sociology”, POSDRU/159/1.5/S/134650, financed through the Operational Sectoral Pro-
gramme human Resources Development 2007-2013 and co-financed by the European Social 
fund. The author would like to thank Dr. Aaron Matta for his very helpful comments on an earlier 
version of his paper, which draws on the doctoral dissertation „A Global Actor in Search of a Voca-
tion: The European Union in Conflict Management after the Cold War”, defended at NSPSPA in 
September 2013. monica.oproiu@dri.snspa.ro.
2 The ESDP was renamed Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) after the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. I will hereinafter use the term CSDP.
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Member States’ interests and political will. Although the EU gradually adopted 
policy documents outlining security concerns, its approach to (external) secu-
rity and crisis management remained elusive. A clarification of strategic goals, 
means and philosophy of intervention was attempted through various initiatives 
spearheaded by the high Representative for CfSP: the European Security 
Strategy of 2003, the Report on its Implementation in 2008 and the two Reports 
on human security and the EU, commissioned in 2004 and 2007. The latter 
two recommended that the EU should adopt the doctrine of human security for 
its foreign, security and defence policy, as an innovative approach to managing 
crises and conflicts around the world. While the concept of human security was 
unclear (and somewhat contested) at the international level, the fragmentation 
of EU external policy across three pillars prevented the emergence of a holis-
tic approach to security and dealing with violent conflicts. By eliminating the 
pillar structure and restructuring the foreign, security and defence policy ma-
chinery of the EU, the Lisbon Treaty aimed to streamline the functioning of the 
Union and improve the coherence of its external action. At the same time, these 
transformations were meant to facilitate the emergence of a so-called ‘com-
prehensive approach’, which combined development, CfSP, CSDP civilian and 
military elements in order to create a comparative advantage for the EU as a 
foreign policy and security actor. Nevertheless, the link between the compre-
hensive approach and human security remains unclear.
This paper explores some of the difficulties of adopting human security as 
the framework for CSDP operations. In addition to the contested nature of the 
concept itself, some of the EU-specific difficulties reside in the legacy of the 
former pillar structure of EU external action and the challenge of reconciling 
the idea of “humanitarian power Europe” with the EU’s (and Member States’) 
security concerns. The paper briefly looks at the emergence of the human 
security concept at international level and the attempts to introduce it in the EU 
doctrine for external assistance. Co-existing in the EU framework with the al-
ternative concept of ‘root-causes approach to conflict’, human security was 
acknowledged as a strategic goal underpinning a “distinctive European ap-
proach to foreign and security policy”.
The analysis of CSDP missions and operations in the Western Balkans – 
especially in Bosnia and herzegovina – and of some of the current operations 
beyond Europe shows that the EU prioritised its own security concerns through 
crisis management, while elements of human security served both the official 
rhetoric and practice as the EU was trying to distinguish itself from other inter-
national actors pursuing the same stabilisation goals. however, some of the 
results achieved in Bosnia and herzegovina prove that post-conflict stabilisa-
tion and security sector reform, while serving the outsiders’ purpose of avoiding 
state failure and the spill-over of instability, might contribute to human security 
on the ground. Later on, the EU gave up attempts to promote human security 
as an official doctrine, while in parallel it began conceptualizing the compre-
hensive approach.
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Recent EU crisis management operations mostly target regions further and 
further from Europe – the neighbours of neighbours.3 As these missions and 
operations tend to have limited mandates, scope and resources, adopting a 
human security framework for CSDP would be both unsuitable and unsustain-
able. Although the rhetoric claims that comprehensive strategies trigger com-
prehensive action, the EU’s ambitions as a security actor remain modest and 
its record of promoting human security, mixed. Without conceptual clarifications, 
operational improvements and capabilities development, the CSDP will slowly 
become emptied of any normative content and strategically irrelevant. After all, 
short-term missions focused on monitoring, mentoring, training and capacity-
building cannot contribute much to the EU’s credentials as a security provider 
nor help ensuring human security for vulnerable populations in volatile contexts.
1. A NEW fRAMEWORK fOR STRENGThENING INTERNATIONAL 
SECURITY: hUMAN SECURITY
The concept of human security was officially introduced in 1994 by the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which stated that human security 
was ‘not a concern with weapons’, but ‘a concern with human life and dignity’4, 
understood as freedom from want (from poverty) and freedom from fear (from 
violence). UNDP defined human security as safety from chronic threats such 
as hunger, disease and repression and as the protection from sudden and 
hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in jobs, in homes or in 
communities – highlighting its seven dimensions: personal, environmental, 
economic, political, community, health and food security.5 The new concept 
was soon taken up by the UN agencies in the fields of development, security 
and health, also becoming part of the basis for the Millennium Development 
Goals aiming to eradicate poverty. A third dimension was added to the two 
existing ones in 2000 through a Report endorsed by the Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan. The document stated that ‘human security in the widest sense 
means much more than the absence of violent conflict. It also entails human 
rights, good governance, access to education and medical assistance and the 
certainty that each individual has opportunities and options for capitalizing on 
3 The term ‘neighbours of neighbours’ was introduced by the European Commission in 2006 
in a Communication on Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy. It usually refers to 
three regions: Africa – Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, Sudan and South Sudan, but also the horn 
of Africa and in particular Somalia; the Middle East – Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and more broadly the 
Arabian Peninsula (Gulf Co-operation Council and Yemen) and Central Asia – mainly Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan, but also the Caspian Sea region as such. Commission of the European Com-
munities, ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on 
Strengthening the European Neighbouring Policy’, COM(2006)726 (4 December 2006), available at 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/registre/docs_autres_institutions/commission_europeenne/com/
2006/0726/COM_COM(2006)0726_EN.pdf>.
4 United Nations Development Programme, ‘human Development Report 1994’ (1994), at 
22, available at <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nos-
tats.pdf>.
5 Ibid., pp. 23-25.
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his or her potential. Any step in this direction means a step forward for reducing 
poverty, economic growth and conflict prevention. freedom from want, freedom 
from fear and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy environment 
are all interdependent elements of human security and implicitly of national 
security’.6 
The Commission on human Security convened by the UN Secretary Gen-
eral presented its Report Human Security Now in May 2003, defining human 
security as protecting ‘the vital core of all human in ways that enhance human 
freedoms and human fulfilment’.7 human security was meant to become part 
of the international community’s agenda of priorities together with peace, se-
curity and development, but it soon became evident that politicians, academics 
and practitioners were overall more receptive to narrowing the concept to free-
dom from fear. Consequently, the quasi-general understanding of the concept 
outside the UN system refers to the need to protect the people against political 
violence and the effects of conflicts. Individual countries like Canada, Japan, 
Norway or Switzerland adopted the concept in their foreign and development 
policy, while concrete initiatives of putting human security into practice at the 
international level resulted in banning the use of anti-personnel mine through 
the Ottawa Treaty (1997) or the adoption of the Rome Statute (1998), the legal 
basis for establishing the International Criminal Court. 
As far as the European Union is concerned, human security is considered 
to have influenced ‘some of the analytical parts of the European Security Strat-
egy of December 2003’,8 without being explicitly mentioned though. Later on, 
it became the topic of a report presented by the Study Group on Europe’s 
Security Capabilities to the high Representative for CfSP Javier Solana in 
September 2004. Solana commissioned the Group under the leadership of 
Professor Mary Kaldor from the London School of Economics in order to explore 
the possibility of the European Union adopting human security as a core con-
cept. 
The Report called ‘A human Security Doctrine for Europe?’ had three main 
components: a set of principles for human security (the primacy of human rights, 
clear political authority, multilateralism, the bottom-up approach, regional focus, 
use of legal instruments and the appropriate use of force), the human Secu-
rity Response force consisting of 15 000 people, of whom at least a third had 
to be civilians, and a new legal framework designed to govern decisions to 
intervene and to direct operations on the ground.9 The document concluded 
that ‘the most appropriate role for Europe in the twenty-first century would be 
6 United Nations Commission on human Security, ‘final Report of the Commission on human 
Security’ (2003), at 4, available at <http://www.unocha.org/humansecurity/chs/finalreport/English/
finalReport.pdf>.
7 Ibid.
8 A. Missiroli, ‘foreword’ to J. Kotsopoulos, ‘A human Security Agenda for the EU?’, Eu-
ropean Policy Centre Issue Paper No. 48 (June 2006), available at <http://www.freewebs.com/
humansecurityconference/EPC-human%20Security.pdf>.
9 M. Kaldor et al., ‘A human security doctrine for Europe: the Barcelona Report of the Study 
Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities’ (2004), available at <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/40209/1/A_
human_security_doctrine_for_Europe%28author%29.pdf>.
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to promote human security’.10 Moreover, it recommended that the EU adopt 
the human security approach in order to realize its ambitions of playing a 
global role in the realm of security and at the same time to reflect its distinctive 
character and agenda dominated by the ideas of peace, democracy and human 
rights instead of the classic nation-state focus on defence of territory.11 The 
human Security Response force would have been designed to play a role 
‘somewhere between classic peace-keeping and classic military intervention 
but different from both’,12 with the goal of supporting respect for human rights, 
law and order.
This interventionist approach distanced the proposed EU doctrine from the 
softer ones that Canada, Switzerland or Japan employed and can be considered 
its ‘biggest weakness’ since the doctrine has not been implemented so far.13 
But even in the absence of such an innovative doctrine, the EU remained 
concerned with the security of individuals and designed various instruments 
for addressing it. The lack of an explicit reference to human security in the 2003 
Security Strategy did not overshadow the EU’s continuous efforts for prevent-
ing conflicts and managing crises through civilian and military means, thus 
adding to its already established status of the world’s leading donor. Mary 
Kaldor showed that there is a discrepancy between the EU lexicon and practice 
in this field, highlighting that what the EU actually does by means of CSDP 
missions – conflict prevention, crisis management and civil-military coordination 
– corresponds to the wider understanding of human security, without the con-
cept being named as such; or, as she was replied during an interview with EU 
officials in London ‘we already do human security, we just don’t call it that’.14
The Study Group led by Mary Kaldor was reconvened in 2006 by the finn-
ish Presidency of the European Council in the context of reviewing the Secu-
rity Strategy and it produced a new report called A European Way of Security. 
This Report took the previous recommendations a step forward and suggested 
that human security should become the basis of a European strategic narrative 
and of its activity as a security actor. hence, human security would represent 
more than a label for the EU’s endeavours; it would be the actual framework 
within which these actions are undertaken: ‘for the European Union, human 
Security is more than just another security concept or label. It can be seen as 
a narrative that encapsulates the goals and methods of a highly diverse foreign 
and security policy system, and which represents them in discussions of se-
curity to different audiences, both the public and professional sector. In other 
words, it is about how Europeans describe their approach to external security. 
10 Ibid., at 29.
11 M. Martin, ‘human Security and the Search for a Normative Narrative’, in R. Whitman 
(ed.), Normative Power Europe. Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan 2011), 187-209, at 199. 
12 M. Kaldor et al., supra note 9, at 11.
13 J. Kotsopoulos, supra note 8, at 12.
14 M. Kaldor et al., ‘human security: a new strategic narrative for Europe’, 83 International 
Affairs 2007, 273-288, at 274.
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At the same time, human Security is an organising frame that specifies how 
external intervention and engagement should be implemented.’15
This kind of clarification as to when, how and why the EU would engage 
externally was expected from the 2003 Security Strategy, but the document 
did not provide such specific guidance. The authors of the two Reports on hu-
man Security identified the need for an EU strategic narrative that would not 
only form the core of a common European strategic culture, but also replace 
the ad-hoc-ism which marked EU external action. They suggested human 
Security as a comprehensive framework providing meaning, distinctiveness 
and predictability to the EU’s philosophy of conflict management and interven-
tion, including the use of force. The Result was that the 2008 Report on the 
Implementation of the European Security Strategy explicitly referred to human 
security as central among the EU’s strategic goals, underpinning a ‘distinctive 
European approach to foreign and security policy’.16 The Report showed that: 
‘We have worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, 
promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development and 
addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity. The EU remains the big-
gest donor to countries in need’.17 This highlights once again the security-
development nexus, previously acknowledged by the 2003 Security Strategy 
and the 2005 Consensus on Development. Together with good governance 
and effective multilateralism, human security could thus guide EU action on 
the world stage, but ‘unlike the UN’s Responsibility to Protect, a human secu-
rity agenda commits member states to no specific obligations, so rather than 
a narrative it features more as a wish that is more normative than positivist, 
more ideal than pragmatic’.18
Although the philosophy behind human security underpins sustainable peace, 
international organisations, including the EU, developed other concepts in 
parallel with, or in order to replace, the all-encompassing one of ‘human secu-
rity’. Among them, the ‘responsibility to protect’19 emerged in 2005 in the UN 
15 M. Kaldor et al., ‘A European Way of Security, The Madrid Report of the human Security 
Study Group comprising a Proposal and Background Report’ (2007), 8-9, available at <http://
eprints.lse.ac.uk/40207/1/A_European_Way_of_Security(author).pdf>.
16 ‘Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security 
in a Changing World’ (11 December 2008), at 3, available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf>.
17 Ibid.
18 M. Martin, supra note 11, at 203. 
19 The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document stated that “Each Individual State has the 
responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity. (…) The international community, through the United Nations, also has the re-
sponsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance 
with Chapter VI and VII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective 
action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the 
Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional 
organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are 
manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity”. United Nations, ‘World Summit Outcome’, Resolution adopted by the 
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system. Its application in Libya in 2011 though sparked renewed controversies 
regarding external intervention, thus losing support for future similar endeavours.
2. ThE ‘ROOT CAUSES’ APPROACh TO CONfLICT PREVENTION: 
ThE COMMISSION’S WAY Of DOING hUMAN SECURITY 
Even before the high Representative for CfSP and his team started envisag-
ing human security as a potential framework for EU external action, the Euro-
pean Commission acknowledged the importance of conflict prevention and 
management of the instability and human suffering that violent conflicts entailed. 
In April 2001 the Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention 
stated that the EU had ‘a duty [emphasis added] to try to address the issues 
that generate or contribute to conflict’ and distinguished between long-term 
prevention (‘Projecting stability’) and short-term prevention (‘Reacting quickly 
to nascent conflicts’).20 
Violent conflict became an omnipresent phenomenon in the aftermath of the 
Cold War, especially as intra-state conflict, most often of ethno-political nature. 
An ethno-political conflict is ‘a particular form of conflict in which the goals of 
at least one conflict party are defined in (exclusively) ethnic terms and in which 
the primary fault line of confrontation is one of ethnic distinctions’.21 When 
turning violent, it produces victims and destruction, but also leads to the col-
lapse of state institutions, human rights abuses, de facto secession, waves of 
refugees and internally displaced people, etc. Terrorist groups can take advan-
tage in this context and infiltrate failing states, set up training camps or ‘opera-
tional’ bases, etc. Organised crime flourishes and helps support the war effort 
(leading to the ‘criminalization of war’), thus criminal groups have a direct inter-
est in the perpetuation of conflict. The proliferation of violent conflicts in the 
Western Balkans and the horn of Africa – the management of which turned 
into costly failures for the international community in the aftermath of the Cold 
War – confirmed the importance of preventive action, as was highlighted in the 
United Nations document ‘An Agenda for Peace’ in 1992.
The European Union tried to rise to this challenge by creating the CfSP 
aiming to coordinate the member states’ foreign and security policies, including 
their responses to international crises. however, the Treaty on the European 
Union (1992) did not offer any precise legal basis for an EU conflict prevention 
policy.22 In the absence of clear legal guidelines, the EU policy for preventing 
General Assembly on 24 October 2005, available at <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/N05/487/60/PDf/N0548760.pdf?OpenElement>.
20 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention’ (11 
April 2001), at 5, <available at http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/crisis_management/docs/com2001
_211_en.pdf>.
21 K. Cordell and S. Wolff, ‘The study of ethnic conflict: an introduction’, in K. Cordell and S. 
Wolff (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict (London and New York: Routledge 2013), 
1-14, at 4.
22 V. Kronnenberger and J. Wouters, ‘Introduction’ to V. Kronnenberger and J. Wouters 
(eds.), The European Union and Conflict Prevention. Policy and Legal Aspects (The hague: 
T.M.C – Asser Press 2004), 17-29, at 21.
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violent conflict emerged and developed on the foundation of existing instru-
ments provided for in the Treaty, which it then gradually extended so as to fit 
this purpose as well.23 Several years later, when the Treaty of Amsterdam 
established the Petersberg tasks24 among CfSP instruments, conflict preven-
tion was again not mentioned. But in June 2001 the EU adopted the Programme 
for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, with the specific aim of mainstreaming 
conflict prevention into all EU institutions,25enhancing its early warning capa-
bilities and developing a common inter-institutional approach to conflict pre-
vention.26 Since 2002, the General Secretariat of the Council has been 
drafting Annual Reports on the implementation of the Göteborg Programme to 
be presented to the June European Council every year. These reports gradu-
ally developed and summarised the so-called ‘root causes approach’ to conflict 
prevention, referring to activities on both the short- and long-term, designed to 
address the underlying causes of emerging or manifest conflicts and eliminate 
them.
The plethora of instruments that the EU developed in this field initially il-
lustrated the pillar structure of the EU: various financing schemes and hu-
manitarian aid were complemented by electoral monitoring missions, Action 
Plans for the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Stabilisation and Association 
Process for the Western Balkans countries, EU Special Representatives sent 
to countries or regions prone to conflict and later CSDP missions undertaking 
security sector reform, police training, consolidation of the rule of law, etc. The 
European Commission, through its External Relations Directorate, prepared in 
2001 a so-called ‘check list’ for root causes of conflicts used for guiding the 
early warning and conflict assessment activities undertaken jointly by the Com-
mission and the Secretary-General/high Representative. A confidential ‘watch 
list’ was regularly updated and worrying developments were brought to the 
attention of the General Affairs and External Relations Council.27 The check 
list comprised eight criteria, each with its own set of questions, the answers to 
which helped providing early warning signs regarding the potential outbreak of 
23 ibid.
24 The original Petersberg tasks assumed by the Western European Union in 1992 comprised 
humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis manage-
ment, including peacemaking. After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 their range 
was expanded in order to include humanitarian and rescue tasks, conflict prevention and peace-
keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking, joint dis-
armament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, and post-conflict stabilisation tasks 
(Article 43(1) Treaty of the European Union 2010, hereafter TEU). 
25 Understood as “the process of establishing an in-house culture of prevention”, according to 
fraser Cameron, An Introduction to EU Foreign Policy (London: Routledge 2007), at 188.
26 Council of the European Union, ‘Draft European Programme for the Prevention of Violent 
Conflicts’ (2001), available at
<http://www.eplo.org/assets/files/3.%20Resources/EU%20Documents/EU_EU_Programme_
for_the_Prevention_of_Violent_Conflicts.pdf>.
27 With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty this Council format was split in two – the 
General Affairs Council presided by the representative of the six-month presidency of the Council 
and the External Relations Council permanently chaired by the high Representative for foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy of the EU.
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conflict.28 The Commission used other tools too, such as regular reporting from 
the Commission delegations all over the world,29 open source information 
monitoring via the Commission’s Crisis Room, EChO’s30 monitoring system 
ICONS (Impending Crises Online News System) and annual surveys done on 
Africa since 2004.31 The check-list was shared with ‘counterparts in the UN 
system’, but also with other donors and agencies working in the field of conflict 
prevention and peace-building.32 In 2001 also the Council established a Rap-
id Reaction Mechanism ‘designed to allow the Community to respond in a 
rapid, efficient and flexible manner, to situations of urgency or crisis or to the 
emergence of crisis.’33
The EU’s philosophy on conflict prevention and management is that the root 
causes of conflicts are generally poverty, lack of good governance, violations 
of human rights, and competition for scarce natural resources. The EU thus 
aimed to develop an ‘integrated and comprehensive approach in the field of 
external relations bringing together all main conflict prevention instruments at 
its disposal – ESDP/CfSP, development, trade, economic, diplomatic, civilian 
and political-military’34 in order to address the various facets of these phenom-
ena. In 2007 the EU created the Instrument for Stability in order to provide more 
flexibility to its involvement in conflict prevention and resolution, to be used 
complementary with CSDP operations, as part of the EU global (in the sense 
of comprehensive) approach to preventing and managing conflicts. 35 In 2009 
the Lisbon Treaty re-organised substantially the EU’s institutions and mecha-
nisms dealing with external relations with the precise goal of providing more 
coherence and effectiveness to its actions. In addition to this, it established 
conflict prevention as one of the main goals of EU foreign policy for the first 
time in an EU treaty. 
To sum up, the European Union did not develop a definition of conflict pre-
vention per se, but acknowledged the need to tackle the root causes of conflicts. 
By adopting a dual approach regarding the instruments to be used on the 
28 European Commission, ‘Check-list for Root-Causes of Conflict’ (2008), at 1, available at 
<http://www.ceipaz.org/images/contenido/European%20Commission%20Check-list%20for%20
Root%20Causes%20of%20Conflict_ENG.pdf>.
29 They were transformed into EU delegations by the Lisbon Treaty and transferred to the 
European External Action Service.
30 European Community humanitarian Office, created in 1992, which became the Directo-
rate-General for humanitarian Aid and later integrated Civil Protection in 2010.
31 European Commission, supra note 28.
32 Ibid.
33 Art. 1, ‘Council Regulation 381/2001 of 26 february 2001 creating a rapid reaction mecha-
nism’, OJ (2001), L57-5, 27.02.2001, available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUri
Serv.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:057:0005:0009:EN:PDf>.
34 Council of the European Union, ‘Presidency Report to the European Council on EU activi-
ties in the framework of prevention, including implementation of the EU Programme for the Pre-
vention of Violent Conflicts’ (13 June 2006), at 8, available at <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/
pdf/en/06/st10/st10158.en06.pdf>. 
35 C. Lavalleé, ‘L’Instrument de Stabilité. Au service de l’approche globale de l’UE’, 15 EU 
Institute for Security Studies Brief 2012, at 2, available at 
<http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/linstrument-de-stabilite-au-service-de-
lapproche-globale-de-lue/>.
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short- and long-term respectively, it highlighted a narrow and a wide under-
standing of the concept. hence, the former refers to ‘the activities undertaken 
over the short-term to reduce manifest tensions and/or to prevent the outbreak 
or recurrence of violent conflict’, while the latter covers activities ‘undertaken 
over the medium- and long-term to address root-causes of conflict in a tar-
geted manner.’36While the record of promoting conflict prevention outside its 
borders is mixed, the European Union has come a long way since its founda-
tion on the premise that ‘world peace can be safeguarded only by creative 
efforts commensurate with the dangers that threaten it’.37 The EU was even 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in December 2012 for having ‘for over six 
decades contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democ-
racy and human rights in Europe’ (Nobel Peace Prize 2012).38 As contested 
as this decision might have been, it represented an acknowledgement of the 
EU’s efforts – and success – in pacifying and democratising most part of Europe 
through enlargement. By developing operational capabilities too, the EU en-
gaged in peace-building beyond its borders, which generated new opportunities 
for conducting its external action along human security lines.
3. hUMAN SECURITY ThROUGh CSDP – LESSONS fROM ThE 
WESTERN BALKANS
Crisis management operations within the CSDP framework have become the 
hallmark of EU action in the field of security. Designed as either military op-
erations or civilian missions or a combination thereof, to be employed outside 
the EU, they contribute to fulfilling the objectives of the EU’s security policy. 
The military operations seek to stabilise countries, reform their armed forces, 
ensure security during critical times (negotiation of peace accords, elections 
in post-conflict environments, etc.) or to provide entry/exit strategies for more 
complex missions deployed by the UN. Civilian missions of training, monitoring, 
reforming and assisting local police forces or rule of law enforcement agencies 
are meant both to ensure democratic standards in the targeted countries and 
to make them more efficient in fighting organised crime and terrorism, for ex-
ample. According to the European External Action Service website (EEAS 
2013), the EU has launched twenty-eight civilian missions and military opera-
tions so far, sixteen of which are ongoing.39 
The literature on the European Union is almost unanimous in highlighting 
the role that the crises and wars in the Western Balkans had for the develop-
36 Ibid.
37 European Coal and Steel Community 1951, Treaty establishing the European Coal and 
Steel Community and Annexes I-III (1951), available at <http://www.nrsr.sk/web/Static/sk-SK/EU/
Doc/zmluva-o-esuo.pdf>. 
38 The Nobel Peace Prize for 2012 – Press Release, available at <http://www.nobelprize.org/
nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2012/press.html>.
39 European External Action Service, ‘Overview of the missions and operations of the Eu-
ropean Union’ (June 2013), available at <http://consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-
operations?lang=en>.
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ment of its security structures and especially CSDP.40 The war in Bosnia and 
herzegovina (April 1992 – October 1995), for example, illustrated what the 
literature labelled as ‘new wars’.41 At the same time, ‘despite numerous idio-
syncrasies’, Bosnia was ‘a typical case of a war with a criminal dimension’42 
– because criminal actors and smuggling networks of goods and weapons 
supported the war effort.43 In the aftermath of the war organised crime struc-
tures became intertwined with former combatants and local political elites, 
contributing to ‘the criminalization of the state and economy’,44 thus undermin-
ing the internationally-led post-war reconstruction and peace-building process. 
NATO, the OSCE and the Western European Union became involved in peace-
keeping and peace-building in Bosnia and herzegovina, working in parallel 
with the United Nations, World Bank and a myriad of international NGOs. The 
EU joined this effort by using a variety of instruments, including two CSDP 
missions – one military (EUfOR Althea, which took over from NATO-led SfOR 
in December 2004) and one civilian (EUPM Police Mission, launched in Janu-
ary 2003). Law enforcement – together with peace enforcement45 under Chap-
ter VII of the UN Charter – played a prominent role in post-war Bosnia. here, 
the rule of law was considered a precondition for peace-building, with the in-
ternational effort concentrating on reform and capacity-building of the police 
and law enforcement sectors.
fighting organised crime thus became a priority for the EU in Bosnia. EUPM 
focused on capacity-building and institution-building within the Bosnian secu-
rity sector, based on the principle of local ownership. The assertiveness of 
EUfOR Althea in fighting organised crime undermined the latter’s efforts and 
authority. A readjustment of mandates solved the problem and put EUPM in 
charge of enabling local police to fight organised crime, with EUfOR playing 
a supportive role. Essentially, the clash between the two EU missions high-
lighted once again the difficulties of civil-military relations in post-conflict re-
construction.
Civil-military relations in peace operations can have multiple dimensions: 
relations between external military forces and internal civilian authorities or 
society; between internal regular or irregular forces and external civilian agen-
cies; and between the external military and civilian actors in conflict environ-
40 C. Bretherton and J. Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor (London: Routledge 
2nd edition 2006), at 196.
41 M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Oxford: Polity Press 
1999).
42 C. friesendorf and S. E. Penksa, ‘Militarized Law Enforcement in Peace Operations: EU-
fOR in Bosnia and herzegovina’, 15 International Peacekeeping 2008, 677-694, at 678.
43 for a detailed account of the role of criminal activities during the war in Bosnia and its af-
termath see P. Andreas, ‘The clandestine political economy of war and peace in Bosnia’, in M. A. 
Innes (ed.), Bosnian Security after Dayton. New Perspectives (London and New York: Routledge 
2006), 71-95.
44 Ibid., at 84.
45 IfOR, SfOR and EUfOR were essentially peacekeeping operations, but with a mandate 
to enforce peace (the military provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement) under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter if necessary.
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ments.46 Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) in peace operations after the Cold 
War has evolved from initial suspicion and distrust towards becoming an insti-
tutionalised ‘partnership’.47 As more and more diverse actors engage in post-
conflict environments, civil-military relations are among the main contributing 
factors to the success of international peace-building efforts. 
The CIMIC doctrine was expanded by NATO which developed its own com-
prehensive approach based on the lessons learned in the Balkans and Af-
ghanistan. Essentially, NATO’s approach refers to the cooperation of different 
actors (political, civilian and military) in theatre.48 The EU too began develop-
ing a ‘comprehensive approach’ which entailed a combination of ‘instruments 
across the pillar divide in a coherent manner, aligning EU policy with those of 
the Member States and improving cooperation with other actors in the field’.49 
More specifically, this translated into civil-military coordination (CMCO) within 
CSDP, as the core of an approach advocating a combination of crisis manage-
ment with diplomatic, economic, developmental and humanitarian tools.50 In 
other words, the comprehensive approach of the EU could be summarised as 
the 3Ds: diplomacy, development and defence.51
The lessons learned in Bosnia emphasised, among other things, the impor-
tance of civil-military coordination in peace-building, which had the potential to 
become the EU’s landmark in crisis management through CSDP missions. In 
fact, as early as 2006 the European Parliament showed in a Resolution on the 
European Security Strategy that ‘the defining characteristic and the additional 
value of CSDP lie in the combination of civilian and military components’ and 
that ‘the EU will in the future be increasingly faced with the challenge of striking 
a good and proper balance between military and civilian components in order 
to fulfil the objectives and the spirit of the EES’.52 The European Parliament’s 
view might have seemed too optimistic since the initial cooperation on the 
ground between EUPM and EUfOR Althea was far from illustrating an easily 
reachable balance between the civilian and military assets deployed in Bosnia 
and herzegovina and even less a facile coordination of the two. At the same 
time, the European Parliament’s resolution contained a vision for the subsequent 
development of CSDP as one among several tools underpinning the EU’s 
comprehensive approach, which proved to be correct in the long run. CSDP 
46 M. Pugh, ‘Civil-Military Relations in International Peace Operations’, in K. L. Spillman, T. 
Bernauer, J. M. Gabriel and A. Wenger (eds.), Peace Support Operations. Lessons Learned and 
Future Perspectives (Bern: Peter Lang 2001), 109-133, at 109.
47 Ibid.
48 A. N. Pirozzi, ‘The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to Conflict Management’, DCAF EU 
Crisis Management Paper Series (June 2013), at 6, available at <http://www.dcaf.ch/content/
download/133240/2067752/file/Pirozzi_EU-CM.PDf>.
49 E. Gross, ‘EU and the Comprehensive Approach’, Danish Institute for International Stud-
ies (DIIS) Report no. 13 (2008), at 7, available at <http://subweb.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/
Reports%202008/R2008-13_EU_and_the_Comprehensive_Approach.pdf>.
50 N. Pirozzi, supra note 48, at 7.
51 European defence encompasses crisis management and the security policy too.
52 ‘European Parliament resolution on the European Security Strategy’, OJ (2006), C33/E, 
9.02.2006, available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:033
E:0580:0590:EN:PDf>.
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has become fundamental for crisis management by the EU in the last ten years 
– especially due to its civil-military potential53 – which, coupled with other CfSP 
instruments, has enabled the EU to position itself as a comprehensive secu-
rity actor. 
Through EUPM in Bosnia and herzegovina, the goal of helping transform 
the Bosnian security forces into a democratic multi-ethnic (and gender sensi-
tive) police – on which the EU mission focused during the first two phases of 
its mandate (2003-2007) – matched the general framework of security sector 
reform in post-conflict environments. Moreover, by transforming what was once 
an instrument of repression into a professional service meant to protect the 
Bosnian citizens, to cater to their security needs and respect human rights 
when enforcing the law, the EU’s police reform initiative fitted the human se-
curity agenda in its ‘freedom from fear’ component. As a result, the Bosnian 
police became one of the most trusted institutions in the country54 and peace-
building registered a success. But the readjustment of the EUPM mandate to 
prioritise the efficiency of Bosnian police in fighting organised crime (as well 
as corruption and terrorism) signalled a shift of priorities, with the EU being 
determined to block threats originating in its geographic proximity. Despite the 
fact that police reform was not completed,55 the EU changed the focus of the 
mission to something more attuned to its interests and further from the human 
security agenda.  
At the same time, as another concrete contribution to human security un-
derstood as ‘freedom from fear’, EUfOR Althea supported the demining op-
erations and the harvesting of small arms and light weapons in Bosnia and 
herzegovina, thus eliminating an important legacy of the former violent conflict.
The EU acknowledged early on in the evolution of CSDP the importance of 
maintaining human rights standards in the conduct of all its missions, by adopt-
ing documents such as: the Generic Standard of Behaviour for ESDP Opera-
tions (in 2005), the Guidelines on Mainstreaming human Rights in ESDP 
Missions (in 2006) and the Conclusions on Promoting Gender Equality and 
Gender Mainstreaming in Crisis Management (also in 2006).56 In 2010 the 
Council acknowledged the Lessons and best practices of mainstreaming hu-
man rights and gender into CSDP military operations and civilian missions, 
which showed that, […] ‘violations of human rights, including ethnic and/or 
gender-based discrimination, are frequently among root causes of conflict. 
Considering that the primary purpose of CSDP operations and missions is to 
promote stabilisation and security, human rights and gender related action are 
53 R. G. and S. Wolff, ‘The European Union as a global conflict manager: capabilities and 
context in an interdependent world’, in R. G. Whitman and S. Wolff (eds.), The European Union 
as a Global Conflict Manager (London and New York: Routledge 2012), 3-20, at 8.
54 I. Ioannides and G. Collantes Celador, ‘The internal-external security nexus and EU po-
lice/rule of law missions in the Western Balkans’, 11 Conflict, Security & Development 2011, 
415-445, at 430.
55 Ibid. 
56 T. hadden, A Responsibility to Assist. EU Policy and Practice in Crisis-management Opera-
tions under European Security and Defence Policy (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: hart Publishing 
2009), at 23.
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thus a natural part of the operations and missions’ tasks in addition to being 
an underlying, general principle of their work’.57 Moreover, the document stat-
ed that ‘based on concepts, and on actual experience in the field, a CSDP 
operation or mission can have either a direct role in the protection of human 
rights and/or a supporting role in relation to the host state’.58
Generally, CSDP missions now have a strong human rights component: the 
deployed personnel have to undergo training in this field and uphold human 
rights and there is usually a human Rights/Gender Officer monitoring these 
specific issues. While the human rights agenda and the concept of human 
security overlap to a certain extent, some authors claim that ‘a focus on main-
taining or restoring human security on the ground may be a more realistic 
objective in situations of crisis-management than seeking to guarantee the full 
range of rights covered in human rights instruments’.59 This argument is more 
convincing especially if human security is understood as ‘creating or restoring 
conditions under which the essentials of human and family life and civil society 
are guaranteed’, while promoting the human rights agenda would refer to de-
livering ‘a range of essential individual and collective rights’.60
Beyond conceptual refinement though, the more practical aspects of the 
human rights and human security agenda which could be promoted through 
CSDP military, police and civilian missions refer to the following ‘broad catego-
ries of intervention’: conflict prevention (early warning and preventive deploy-
ment), humanitarian aid, protection of civilians and their homes from attack, 
the maintenance of public order, prevention of general and organised criminal-
ity (re)building national security and democratic institutions and the inclusion 
of economic and social development as an integral element of all crisis man-
agement missions.61 Also related to the human rights agenda, the interna-
tional missions have an obligation to respect the human rights of the local 
populations and to control potential abuses; the main concerns at this level 
could include: effective control of the use of lethal force, prevention of torture 
or inhuman/degrading treatment, prevention of sexual abuses, prevention of 
corruption, establishing effective accountability and minimising the economic 
impact of the internationals.62 
By engaging in the Western Balkans, the EU tried to build the credentials 
of CSDP. After a modest military endeavour doubled by two police reform mis-
sions in fYROM, the EU ventured outside Europe with a military operation in 
DR Congo, limited in scope. hence, the real test for CSDP was undergone in 
Bosnia, where the EU deployed a civilian mission and a military operation, 
combined with extended financial assistance and a complex democratisation 
57 Council of the European Union, ‘Lessons and best practices of mainstreaming human 
rights and gender into CSDP military operations and civilian missions’ (30 November 2010), at 
8, available at <http://www.civcap.info/fileadmin/user_upload/Working_Group/CIVCOM_Lessons
Learned.pdf>. 
58 Ibid.
59 See T. hadden, supra note 56, at 24.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., at 25.
62 Ibid., at 30.
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process. EUfOR Althea had to maintain a safe and secure environment allow-
ing international organisations on the ground, together with local political actors, 
to pursue conflict resolution and reconciliation goals on the long-term. EUPM’s 
mission only had the purpose and means to support peace building in a very 
specific area – police reform – in the wider framework of security sector reform. 
from this perspective, both contributed to human security by helping restore 
or create the conditions for the resumption of normal patterns of life in Bosnia. 
The commitment for the stabilisation of the Western Balkans has not been 
equated in other regions, but the proliferation of CSDP missions outside Europe 
offered one more opportunity for clarifying the relation between CSDP and 
human security.
4. CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN AfRICA: BETWEEN ThE 
‘COMPREhENSIVE APPROACh’ IN ACTION AND hUMAN 
SECURITY RELOADED?
After testing the ESDP in 2003 through civilian and military operations in the 
Western Balkans, the EU deployed a military operation in the DR Congo and 
positioned itself as a regional partner of the UN. Despite attaining the general 
objectives of the mission, the EU was unable – because of a lack of consensus 
among member states – to undertake a similar operation in Darfur, Sudan in 
2006 at the request of the UN Secretary General. In the meantime, small civil-
ian missions mushroomed within the CSDP framework, among which EUJUST 
Themis in Georgia broke new ground as the EU’s first rule of law mission. It 
was designed to assist local authorities in developing an overarching criminal 
justice reform strategy based on the principle of local ownership.63 While Geor-
gia was not necessarily in crisis – despite the post-revolutionary tension – the 
mission was sent in the CSDP crisis management framework in order to raise 
the political profile of the EU, ensure effective control over it and implement 
quick-impact measures, as its mandate was only for a year.64 A reform strat-
egy was adopted by the Georgian authorities in July 2005, thus indicating that 
the mission fulfilled its objective, but it did not lead to a more assertive EU 
policy in this area.65 
Other civilian CSDP deployments entailed two border assistance missions 
in the Palestinian territories, three police and security sector reform missions 
in DR Congo, supporting missions for UN-led missions AMIS and AMISOM in 
Sudan and Somalia respectively and a monitoring mission in Aceh, Indonesia. 
In addition to this, the EU undertook two military operations in the DR Congo 
and Tchad/RCA respectively. In 2008 the EU launched two innovative opera-
tions: EULEx Kosovo, the biggest EU civilian mission to date (an integrated 
rule of law mission, with an executive mandate) and EUNAVfOR Atalanta, the 
63 x. Kurowska, “EUJUST Themis (Georgia)”, in G. Grevi et al. (eds.), European Security 
and Defence Policy. The First 10 Years (1999-2009) (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies 
2009), 201-210, at 205. 
64 Ibid., at 204.
65 Ibid., at 207.
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first naval operation of the EU. Aiming to combat piracy off the coast of Soma-
lia and in the Gulf of Aden, but also to protect the World food Programme 
vessels delivering aid to displaced persons in Somalia and AMISOM shipping, 
EUNAVfOR Atalanta was the last large scale military operation deployed by 
the EU. Also in 2008, the EU sent an unarmed monitoring mission in Georgia 
in the aftermath of the Russia-Georgia War in August. The other missions that 
the EU deployed before 2008 were not necessarily linked to crisis management, 
but had a post-conflict reconstruction component focused on rule of law and 
security sector reform (EUJUST LEx Iraq, EUPOL Afghanistan, EU SSR Guin-
ea-Bissau, etc). 
The hiatus in operations between 2008 and 2011 was mostly due to the 
economic crisis, but also to a certain ‘intervention fatigue’, together with the 
restructuring of the EU foreign and security policy machinery triggered by the 
Lisbon Treaty. The creation from scratch of an institution as complex as the 
European External Action Service was prioritised during the first three years of 
the new high Representative’s mandate to the detriment of operational devel-
opment of CSDP. The Arab Spring did not break this stalemate: the member 
states agreed in April 2011 on a military operation to support humanitarian as-
sistance to the people of Libya in the midst of the crisis, but it was never 
launched. EUTM Somalia – a small-scale military mission based in neighbour-
ing Uganda, which contributes to the training of the Somali security forces 
loyal to the transitional government, was the only ‘proof of life’ from CSDP after 
the launch of EUNAVfOR Atalanta in December 2008.
Since 2012 though, three new missions have been deployed to Africa (all 
civilian), as part of a comprehensive strategy targeting the horn of Africa66 – 
the most unstable region on the continent, home to failing or weak states such 
as Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan. EUCAP NESTOR, EUNAVSEC South 
Sudan and EUSEC Niger signalled the EU’s re-engagement in crisis manage-
ment.67 The latter two are part of the Comprehensive Strategy for Security and 
Development in the Sahel recently adopted by the European External Action 
Service.68 In parallel, the extension of EUNAVfOR Atalanta’s mandate and 
area of operation (to include internal waters together with coastal territory, thus 
allowing for strikes against pirates onshore too)69 illustrated the EU’s commit-
ment to continue fighting piracy in the West Indian Ocean/Gulf of Aden. The 
complementarities and linkages between EUNAVfOR Atalanta, EUTM Soma-
lia and EUCAP Nestor are meant to embody the EU’s integrated approach to 
66 The horn of Africa is defined as the countries belonging to the Inter-Governmental Author-
ity for Development (IGAD) – Dijbouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan 
and Uganda. Council of the European Union, ‘horn of Africa – Council Conclusions’, 3124th for-
eign Affairs Council meeting (14 November 2011), available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126052.pdf>.
67 G. faleg and S. Blockmans, ‘The EU’s re-engagement as a security actor: fresh start or 
still sleepwalking?’, CEPS Commentaries (12 July 2012), at 2, available at <http://www.ceps.eu/
book/eu%E2%80%99s-re-engagement-security-actor-fresh-start-or-still-sleepwalking>.
68 European External Action Service, ‘Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel’ 
(2011), available at <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf>.
69 See G. faleg and S. Blockmans, supra note 67, at 2. 
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crisis management, based on civil-military coordination,70 supposedly enhanced 
by the Lisbon Treaty. 
This revival of CSDP on African soil helped the EU in forging its ‘compre-
hensive approach’ to external conflicts and crises, as highlighted by a Joint 
Communication from the Commission and the high Representative for foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy adopted in December 2013. The document acknowl-
edged that: ‘the concept of such a comprehensive approach is not new as such. 
It has already been successfully applied as the organizing principle for EU ac-
tion in many cases in recent years, for example, in the horn of Africa, the Sahel 
and the Great Lakes. however, the ideas and principles governing the com-
prehensive approach have yet to become, systematically, the guiding principles 
for EU external action across all areas, in particular in relation to conflict pre-
vention and crisis resolution’.71 The Joint Communication then set out a num-
ber of concrete steps to be taken towards ‘an increasingly comprehensive 
approach’ in EU external policies and action and clarified that it refers ‘not only 
to the joined-up deployment of EU instruments and resources, but also to the 
shared responsibility of EU-level actors and Member States’.72 In May 2014 
the foreign Affairs Council issued Conclusions on the Comprehensive Ap-
proach, after examining the developments triggered by the Joint Communica-
tion and the regional strategies for the horn of Africa and Sahel, as useful 
models for engagement in other policy areas or regions (such as the Gulf of 
Guinea).73 human security was not mentioned at all. The comprehensive ap-
proach was thus established within the EU as the main conceptual and meth-
odological tool for conflict prevention, crisis management and tackling the issue 
of fragile states around the world.
Consequently, it seems that human security (as the essence of sustainable 
peace) is at present far from becoming the core of CSDP operations or EU 
rhetoric on its deployments. It is important though to highlight all opportunities 
for the EU to conduct its crisis management operations based on more than 
just security motivations. The European Parliament undertook a review of CSDP 
missions in 2010 and suggested, among other things, avenues for not only 
improving their effectiveness and efficiency, but also for moving a step further 
in some cases. 
In the ‘Report on the development of CSDP following the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty’, the European Parliament showed that in the DR Congo74 
70 Ibid., at 3.
71 European Commission and the high Representative of the European Union for foreign Af-
fairs and Security Policy, ‘Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council – The 
EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises’ (11 December 2013), at 2, available 
at <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131211_03_en.pdf>.
72 Ibid., at 3.
73 Council of the European Union, ‘Main results of the Council – Press Release 3312th Coun-
cil meeting foreign Affairs’, 9542/14 (12 May 2014), at 18, available at <http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142563.pdf>.
74 In an article called ‘A force for good? The European Union and human security in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo’ Mary Martin analysed the EU’s military mission EUfOR RDC 
deployed in 2006 and showed that ‘it has been the most striking example so far of the EU using 
human security as a methodology for its external engagement, and this experience is expected 
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for example, where several EU missions have been sent and had ‘limited 
positive effects on target groups if any’, it might be the case to revamp them 
so as to start playing an enhanced role against sexual violence and increase 
their efficiency.75 As a police mission aimed at reforming the Congolese police 
and improving its interaction with the justice sector, EUPOL DR Congo had a 
component of providing technical expertise on cross-cutting issues such as 
human rights, gender, protecting children in armed conflict and combating 
impunity for sexual violence.76 Sexual violence is usually one of the main 
features of conflict and even post-conflict environments, the containment and 
elimination of which would really make a difference for the people living there. 
DR Congo is a case in point, as this phenomenon has proved pervasive and 
of an unprecedented scale for the last fifteen years.77 In fact, it has become 
a weapon of war.78 Tasking the EU mission with more than assisting the local 
authorities in fighting sexual violence in DR Congo would thus have been a 
significant addition, yet the mission ended in September 2014 without such a 
development of its mandate. 
In the quest for efficiency, the achievements of CSDP missions should not 
be evaluated only according to the criterion of having fulfilled their mandate. 
As the latter are usually quite limited in scope, even for civilian missions, not 
to mention those for military operations – achieving the stated goals is most 
often possible. But another way to look at EU missions and operations – es-
pecially from the perspective of human security – is to try to assess their impact 
in the daily lives of the people in the countries where the EU decided to inter-
vene. In this particular case, an enhanced role of the EU mission against 
sexual violence in DR Congo – if done right – might have been a way to put 
into practice the human security concept and to show that EU engagement on 
the ground can actually make a difference in that respect. 
The UN Secretary General’s Report regarding sexual violence in conflict 
painted a grim picture of DR Congo, where not only members of various armed 
groups use sexual violence against women as retaliation or a modality to instil 
fear in the local communities, but former elements of these armed groups that 
have been included in the Congolese Police and the Congolese Army respec-
to establish a framework for future military and civilian assistance to Africa’. M. Martin, ‘A force 
for good? The European Union and human security in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, in 16 
African Security Review 2007, 89-99, at 64. 
75 European Parliament, ‘Report on the development of the common security and de-
fence policy following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty’ (29 April 2011), at 18, availa-
ble at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2011-
0166&language=EN>.
76 Council of the European Union, ‘EU Police Mission for the DRC (EUPOL RD Congo)’, Com-
mon Security and Defence Factsheet (february 2014), available at <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/
csdp/missions-and-operations/eupol-rd-congo/pdf/factsheet_eupol_rd_congo_en.pdf>.
77 CNN, ‘UNICEf reports sexual violence in the Congo region’ (6 November 2010), avail-
able at <http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/11/06/angola.congo.sexual.violence/index.
html?iref=allsearch>. According to CNN, UN representatives have named the Democratic Re-
public of Congo “the rape capital of the world” in 2009. 
78 Ibid.
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tively also get involved in such episodes.79 This requires careful vetting of army 
and police in order to make sure that such radical elements do not get to serve 
under the government’s authority. The role of the EU mission hence became 
even more important, as police mentoring and training will be essential in trying 
to uproot these practices. At the same time, the UN Report highlighted that ‘as 
long as the soldiers are irregularly or inadequately paid, they will be more prone 
to committing exactions against communities’.80 And that is something any EU 
mission cannot tackle on its own, it having to do more with a long term strat-
egy to stabilise the country so that adequate funding of public services and 
state institutions is ensured. here is where the comprehensive approach would 
prove its worth as a methodology, by ensuring that EU financial assistance 
helps the long-term functioning of the institutions targeted by security sector 
reform undertaken through the CSDP missions.
This is only an example of how the EU could have tried to boost CSDP’s 
human security agenda. The deployment record of the CSDP in the last few 
years illustrates a preference for Africa, as the former trouble spot represented 
by the Western Balkans shifted towards stabilisation. At the same time, the EU 
did not shy away from deploying to places as exotic as Indonesia, while its 
participation in Afghanistan or the Middle East came as an effort to share the 
burden with the United States. A singular presence in the former Soviet space 
– in Georgia and at the border between Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova 
– the EU was tolerated by Russia to send civilian missions in its main area of 
interest, but the competition for the Eastern neighbourhood has recently become 
more intense.81
The predominance of civilian missions is a pattern which did not changed 
in time. At present, the combination of civilian and military elements in an inte-
grated approach represents the EU’s comparative advantage among security 
providers and it should eventually become the defining element of CSDP. from 
now on, it is the complexity of the missions that will determine whether the 
Union can make a difference through crisis management and if human secu-
rity could serve as a refreshing narrative for the EU’s endeavours in the secu-
rity realm. As Mary Martin previously argued, ‘in the EU, a proliferation of 
different, and sometimes competing policy descriptors such as crisis manage-
ment, conflict prevention, civil-military cooperation and rapid response under-
line the incoherence and fragmentation of its external action’.82 Now that the 
post-Lisbon developments favour an increase in coherence after the removal 
of pillar structure, the case could be made again for ‘an explicit commitment to 
79 United Nations, ‘Sexual Violence in Conflict’, Report by the Secretary General (14 March 
2013), available at <http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/149>.
80 Ibid.
81 In the Republic of Moldova progress towards aligning to EU political standards is punished 
by Russia with economic measures, while in Ukraine the situation became dramatic after former 
President Yanukovic refused to forge closer ties with the EU, he was deposed and then Russia 
annexed Crimea and started supporting the separatist movements in the Eastern part of the 
country . 
82 See M. Martin, supra note 74, at 70.
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a human security approach [which] could serve as an effective organising frame 
and mindmap’83 of EU external assistance. 
CONCLUSION
Crisis management and conflict resolution have never been easy, less so in 
the aftermath of the Cold War, when the increasing number and complexity of 
conflicts and crises around the world required the international community to 
act with determination and a renewed set of tools. The European Union was a 
latecomer in this field, but its political ambitions and security concerns, to-
gether with the geographic proximity to conflict areas, prompted it to try to 
manage them. Endowed with a unique set of instruments, the EU seemed well 
placed to undertake such a difficult task. The operational development of its 
security and defence policy enabled the EU to deploy crisis management mis-
sions on three different continents, though the majority of them were limited in 
size and scope. In parallel, the Commission expanded its set of instruments 
for dealing with instability, from development cooperation to support for secu-
rity sector reform, based on the belief that external assistance needs to address 
the root causes of conflicts.
Gradually, the real issue became that of using all available instruments and, 
what is more important, to use them in a coordinated and timely manner. Using 
them all when tackling a conflict or a crisis would indicate a special interest of 
the EU in the respective country or region, but also the existence of a coherent 
policy, which the EU has recently begun to conceptualise as the ‘comprehensive 
approach’.84 This enables the EU to ‘enhance its added value’85 on the inter-
national stage, as it translates into a holistic view of potential crises and threats, 
accompanied by a wide range of instruments at its disposal for addressing 
them. however, the comprehensive approach seems to be more of a method-
ology than a philosophy underpinning EU external action in general. As far as 
CSDP crisis management operations are concerned, they need to be inte-
grated in a wider policy framework in order to be successful. In addition to this, 
they should be underpinned by a distinct philosophy helping the EU to set and 
communicate its goals more clearly.86 As the quest for a unifying narrative for 
83 Ibid.
84 It involves ‘the mobilisation of the entire range of instruments available to the Union to ad-
dress the full cycle of crisis prevention, response and recovery’, according to L. Barry, ‘European 
Security in the 21st Century: The EU’s Comprehensive Approach’, the Institute of International and 
European Affairs (12 July 2012), at 1, available at <http://www.iiea.com/publications/european-
security-in-the-21st-century-the-eus-comprehensive-approach>.
85 Ibid.
86 ‘Maintaining public support for our global engagement is fundamental. In modern democ-
racies, where media and public opinion are crucial to shaping policy, popular commitment is 
essential to sustaining our commitments abroad. We deploy police, judicial experts and soldiers 
in unstable zones around the world. There is an onus on government, parliaments and EU insti-
tutions to communicate how this contributes to security at home’. See the ‘Report on the Imple-
mentation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World’, supra 
note 16, at 18.
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the EU security policy and crisis management operations was overshadowed 
by the need to develop capabilities and invest more in defence at the Euro-
pean Council in December 2013, the Member States seemed to have moved 
on to more pragmatic priorities. for now, the comprehensive approach remains 
the name of the game and any subsequent attempts of conceptual clarification 
as to whether or how the EU ‘does’ human security will be left to the new high 
Representative and maybe the European Commission, if undertaken at all.
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tHE EuRopEan union and tHE intERnationaL Community
hannes Peltonen
1. INTRODUCTION1
To give three examples, the international community is called upon to ensure 
human security, to act regarding climate change, and to re-think global econ-
omy and finance. But what is the international community? Which actors com-
pose it? how does it differ from such other central International Relations 
concepts as ‘international system’ and ‘international society’? Why is this of 
importance to the European Union (EU)?
Before proceeding it is useful to first recall that concepts and conceptual 
distinctions are of great importance in their own right as, for instance, any good 
lawyer knows. It does make a difference whether at stake is ‘murder’ or ‘man-
slaughter’, even though the most important fact is the same in both: a dead 
body. This small example shows, how concepts ‘mediate and structure our 
experience of the world (apprehension) and our reflections on that experience 
(comprehension)’.2 The example should also drive home the point that our 
languages do not simply mirror pre-existing structures and relations. Instead, 
they structure reality.3 Searle has gone even as far as to argue that all of 
social reality is constructed with the help of concepts and conceptual distinc-
tions.4
Second, the distinctions between ‘international system’, ‘international soci-
ety’, and ‘international community’ have been of interest at least in the field of 
International Relations (IR). The international system is usually understood in 
Waltzian terms: it is ‘composed of a structure and of interacting units’ – name-
ly states – where ‘structure is defined by the arrangement of its parts’.5 In the 
contemporary world, the international system is understood as a reference to 
the historical European international system writ global due to European ex-
1 The author would like to thank Aaron Matta, the anonymous reviewers, and the editorial 
team for their comments and suggestions. The author would also like to thank Juha Perttula and 
the University of Lapland, finland, as this work makes use of some of the research the author 
conducted during his earlier employment there.
2 J. W. Davis, Terms of inquiry: On the theory and practice of political science (Baltimore: 
Johns hopkins University Press 2005), at 11.
3 This does not imply a denial of materiality and its relevance, also evident in the example.
4 J. R. Searle, Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press 2011). In a nutshell, his argument is that all of social reality is constructed 
through status function declarations, which in their simplest form are of the following kind: x 
counts as Y in context C.
5 K. Neal Waltz (ed.), Theory of international politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 2010), 
79-80. for another ‘mechanistic’ understanding, see also A. Wolfers, Discord and collaboration: 
Essays on international politics (Baltimore: Johns hopkins University Press 1962).
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pansion.6 In contrast, the international society, a central English School concept, 
differs from the international system. hedley Bull has argued that an interna-
tional system is transformed into an international society in the presence of 
three elementary goals: some protection from violence, some guarantee that 
promises and agreements are kept, and an arrangement of property rights.7 
here, of importance is for instance a shared identity, ‘we, the sovereigns’ among 
members of the international society as opposed to, say, the ‘barbarians’ or the 
Other.8 A further distinction has been made between ‘society’ and ‘commu-
nity’. famously in sociology, Tönnies distinguished between Geschellschaft 
(society) and Gemeinschaft (community).9 This distinction between a ‘con-
tractual’ society and a ‘familial’ community, which is usually exemplified with a 
reference to clans and tribes, has influenced also a number of older and more 
recent (IR) discussions.10 for instance, the EU and the North Atlantic are 
considered examples of international communities due to the strong shared 
identities or a common ethos prevalent among their members.
here, though, one perceives a discord between the notion that concepts 
structure and construct social reality and the common distinctions prevalent in 
these discussions. It seems that the IR distinctions rely on an understanding 
of concepts that treat concepts as a kind of reference to something ‘out there’, 
instead of considering that our concepts do not mirror reality, but that they are 
part of constructing it. for example calling the EU a subglobal international 
community is not (just) a statement of fact, but part of constructing that state-
ment as a fact.11
With these thoughts in mind, this paper proposes an alternative understand-
ing of the concept ‘international community’ and explores its relevance for the 
EU.12 My suggestion is that the term ‘international community’ need not refer 
to some pre-existing collectivity ‘out there’, but (at least at times) its use aims 
to establish the very collectivity to which it is supposed to refer. One benefit of 
6 R. Koslowski, Migrants and citizens: Demographic change in the European state system 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2000), at 49ff.
7 h. Bull and A. hurrell (eds.), The Anarchical Society: A study of order in world politics (New 
York: Columbia University Press 2002), at 4ff.
8 B. Buzan, ‘from International System to International Society: Structural Realism and 
Regime Theory Meet the English School’, 47 International Organization 1993, 345-48. Consider 
the different rule sets that applied among European states in their dealings among themselves 
and between European states and such ‘Others’ as the indigenous peoples in the New World and 
Asia. See e.g. W. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law, trans. Michael Byers (New York: de 
Gruyter 2000).
9 f. Tönnies, Community and Civil Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001).
10 See e.g. K. W. Deutsch et al., ‘Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: Internation-
al Organization in Light of historical Experience’ (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1957); f. 
Schimmelfennig, ‘Goffman Meets IR: Dramaturgical Action in International Community’, 12 Inter-
national Review of Sociology 2002; B. Buzan and A. Gonzalez-Pelaez, ‘International Community’ 
after Iraq’, 81 International Affairs 2005.
11 Incidentally, ‘fact’ has its etymological roots in the word ‘factum’, literally ‘thing done’, and 
‘facere’, ‘to do’.
12 I articulated a general, first version of this proposal in h. Peltonen, ‘In or out? International 
community membership: beliefs, behaviour, contextuality and principles’, Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs 2012. 
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my suggestion is that it bypasses, for instance, such problems as determining 
which actors share a sufficiently strong identity in order to be counted as a 
member, because the alternative approach begins by assuming that the mem-
bership of the configuration depends more on which actors are relevant in a 
given context. Thus, while approaches emphasising a common ethos or a 
shared identity imply relatively static international community membership, my 
alternative offers an explanation of why the international community’s member-
ship may be even radically different, for instance, in a human security context 
than in a climate change context, even though in both the reference is to the 
international community. In other words, at stake is not the presence of two 
pre-existing international communities, but the construction of two collectivities 
within two different contexts. 
My argument proceeds in the following order. first, given the focus of this 
volume, of which this paper is part, I draw from human security and use the 
responsibility to protect (RtoP) framework as an illustrative example of the role 
that the international community is supposed to play globally.13 Within the RtoP 
framework, the international community is understood to be vicariously and 
collectively responsible for atrocities it has not committed. I also refer to the 
UN Secretary-General’s suggestions regarding relevant RtoP actors in order 
to introduce the idea that ‘international community’ is not synonymous with 
‘international society’, namely the society of states. 
The second section begins by outlining two orthodox approaches to under-
standing the international community. Such proposals often draw from socio-
logical distinctions, and the resulting understandings of the international 
community emphasise what is shared by particular actors in a relatively du-
rable fashion, namely identity or ethos. In contrast to these, I introduce and 
explain my alternative proposal for understanding what the concept ‘interna-
tional community’ is and does. 
The third section concerns a challenge and opportunities arising from my 
proposal. The challenge is to know which actors are relevant and therefore 
members of a given configuration known as the international community with-
in a particular context. This challenge is heightened by time being also a factor, 
since for instance particular actors may be relevant during the first stages of a 
humanitarian operation but not during later stages, while some might be high-
ly relevant throughout. The opportunities arise from this challenge for some 
respectable and legitimate actor or organisation to operate as a coordinator, 
which in practice would entail also some degree of leadership.
The conclusion summarises my argument that the EU is in a rather unique 
position in many respects to shape the international community and its re-
sponses to the calls for collective global action.
13 Note, I refer to RtoP as a framework, but others consider it for example a (nascent) norm 
or a principle. See e.g. C. G. Badescu and T. G. Weiss, ‘Misrepresenting R2P and Advancing 
Norms: An Alternative Spiral?’, 11 International Studies Perspectives 2010; h. Peltonen, Inter-
national Responsibility and Grave Humanitarian Crises: Collective Provision for Human Security 
(New York: Routledge 2013); h. Peltonen, ‘Theory and Practice: RtoP According to Alex Bellamy 
and Martti Antola’, 43 Kosmopolis 2013.
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2. COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
In 2005 heads of state and government agreed unanimously to the World Sum-
mit Outcome.14 Part of it is the individual responsibility of each state to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity, here known as the four RtoP crimes.15 Since such responsibilities 
are included more or less in other treaties and conventions, the responsibility 
to protect (RtoP) ‘does not alter, indeed it reinforces, the legal obligations of 
Member States.’16 Yet, some have expressed that RtoP amounts to redefining 
sovereignty as responsibility, which in turn allegedly challenges traditional 
‘Westphalian’ notions of sovereignty.17 This, according to the UN Secretary-
General, is not the case: RtoP is ‘an ally of sovereignty, not an adversary.’18 
he argues that RtoP is about helping states succeed rather than about weak-
ening sovereignty and reacting to state failure.19 While these matters concern-
ing individual responsibilities of states are significant in many respects, in this 
paper, though, I focus on RtoP’s collective level.
In addition to the individual responsibilities, RtoP entails also collective re-
sponsibilities. The international community ‘should, as appropriate, encourage 
and help States to exercise this [individual] responsibility.’20 Moreover, if states 
fail manifestly in protecting their populations from the four RtoP crimes, the 
international community has, ‘through the United Nations, also […] the respon-
sibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, 
in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect popula-
tions.’ Note, the reference to both peaceful and forceful humanitarian measures, 
which is confirmed by another statement in the Document: ‘we are prepared 
to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security 
Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-
case basis.’21 
14 United Nations General Assembly, ‘World Summit Outcome’ (2005).
15 Ibid., para. 138.
16 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Implementing the responsibility to protect: Report of the 
Secretary General’ (2009), para. 3.
17 On the Westphalian myth, see A. Osiander, ‘Sovereignty, International Relations, and the 
Westphalian Myth’, 55 International Organization 2001. On the alleged challenge, see e.g. E. 
Newman, ‘Intervention – Why, When and how? Written evidence’, house of Commons Defence 
Committee Inquiry (2013). Note also E. C. Luck, ‘Sovereignty, Choice, and the Responsibility to 
Protect’, 1 Global Responsibility to Protect 2009. Luck argues that reservations to RtoP are not 
limited to the global South, albeit the reservations regarding sovereignty and the practical imple-
mentation of RtoP may differ between states in the North and in the South. According Luck (at 
11), ‘sources of sovereignty-induced ambivalence – that affecting the North and that affecting the 
South – were largely addressed in the formulation of RtoP contained in the Outcome Document.’
18 See United Nations General Assembly, supra note 14, para. 10(a). 
19 Ibid., para. 10(a). Note that the Secretary-General affirms RtoP’s narrow scope (genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity), and that attempts to extend it to other 
calamities would undermine the 2005 consensus
20 The international community should also ‘support the United Nations in establishing an 
early warning capability.’
21 United Nations General Assembly, “World Summit Outcome.” Par. 139. This should not be 
taken as an indication that RtoP is only about forceful humanitarian intervention, since prevention 
is central to the RtoP framework.
cleer14-5_inside_proof-01.indb   60 1/7/2015   2:04:46 PM
61
The European Union and the international community
CLEER WORKING PAPERS 2014/5
Note that within the RtoP framework, the international community’s collective 
responsibility to act in cases of manifest individual state failure to protect pop-
ulations is not due to a transfer of responsibility from that individual state. 
Rather, the Outcome Document’s intent is that the international community has 
‘an ongoing, generic responsibility.’22 One can express this as the interna-
tional community having an ultimate, albeit vicarious, responsibility to protect 
populations around the globe from the four RtoP crimes. In other words, the 
international community is not responsible due to it having committed a wrong, 
it being indirectly responsible for a wrong committed, or from it having failed to 
protect particular populations.23 Such responsibility remains with individual 
states, within whose borders those populations reside. Rather, the interna-
tional community is to operate as a ‘safety net’ exactly because the state pri-
marily responsible is unable or unwilling to protect vulnerable populations, or 
it is itself the perpetrator of RtoP crimes. This vicarious, collective responsibil-
ity of the international community is ‘activated’ when a given state fails mani-
festly, because the RtoP framework assigns the international community a 
responsibility to prevent, stop, or alleviate particular crimes committed by oth-
ers, not as the primary (initial) actor, but when individual states fail in such 
endeavours or commit such crimes themselves.
The international community’s collective responsibility is highlighted in the 
UN Secretary-General’s proposal to understand RtoP via three pillars.24 Par-
ticularly the third pillar concerns collective reactions to manifest failures of in-
dividual states.25 The international community’s collective responsibility is 
activated in cases where states refuse international prevention and protection 
assistance, commit egregious crimes and violations relating to RtoP, and fail 
to respond to less coercive measures. Through such actions, states challenge 
the international community to live up to its own responsibilities.26 Especially 
condemning in such cases is that the state in question has not only failed in its 
responsibilities, but it also prevents external help, or commits crimes and viola-
tions against its population. Central to the international community’s range of 
actions are collective enforcement measures.27 To be legal (and effective), 
some enforcement measures would require authorisation from the Security 
Council but not all. Illustrative examples are investigations and fact-finding 
missions conducted by intergovernmental bodies,28 which might make use of 
the Secretary-General’s office or regional and subregional arrangements.29 
Clearly, the EU is one important actor in these senses due to its material and 
22 See United Nations General Assembly, supra note 14, para. 49 (Emphasis added).
23 On vicarious responsibility, see e.g. P. Cane, Responsibility in law and morality (Oxford: 
hart 2002), at 175ff.
24 The Secretary-General has proposed that the RtoP framework should be understood to 
be composed of three main pillars. The first concerns the protection responsibilities of individual 
states. The second pillar focuses on international assistance and capacity-building. The third pil-
lar concentrates on timely and decisive responses.
25 See United Nations General Assembly, supra note 14.
26 Ibid., para. 56.
27 Ibid., para. 56-7.
28 Ibid., para. 52.
29 Ibid., para. 51.
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diplomatic capabilities and existing structures and networks outside the Union. 
Moreover, the EU (as an autonomous actor) is not a member of the UN Secu-
rity Council, which could be an important detail in some contexts.
The EU’s potential role as part of the international community comes out 
also in relation to the second pillar suggested by the UN Secretary-General. 
Mostly, the second pillar relates to ‘persuading States to do what they ought to 
do … [and to] mutual commitment and an active partnership between the in-
ternational community and the State.’30 By this is meant ‘international assis-
tance and capacity-building’ in its various forms, including region-to-region 
cooperation (possibly facilitated by the UN),31 assistance by regional and 
subregional organisations,32 consent-based preventative military deployment,33 
and development aid.34 The EU has competence in all of these examples, 
albeit perhaps the EU’s (as distinguished from those of some of its members’) 
military deployment capabilities are more limited than the others. The EU is 
better at such aspects of the second pillar as ‘confidential or public suasion, 
education, training and/or assistance.’35 The continued understanding of the 
EU as a ‘civilian power’ already from the 1970s onward and the related ‘EU as 
a normative power’, testify to this.36 furthermore, as hinted at earlier, the EU 
is not a member of the Security Council (even though some of its members 
are), which may at times be of important diplomatic significance, for example 
in peace mediation efforts. Note, however, that while such diverse actors as 
the transnational civil society and various advocacy groups can and do play 
significant roles, particularly regarding RtoP preventative efforts, the EU and 
its actions carry a different kind of weight than for example the previously 
mentioned non-state actors. As an example, consider the impact the EU may 
have by linking its trade with pressuring particular actors to reconsider the 
course of their actions.37
By linking the EU with the international community and the second pillar I 
have followed the Secretary-General’s general interpretation of the interna-
tional community. The international community is not simply a collection of 
states – conceptually the latter would be the society of states or the interna-
30 Ibid., para. 28.
31 Ibid., para. 37.
32 Ibid., para. 38.
33 Ibid., para. 42.
34 Ibid., para. 43-4.
35 Ibid., para. 30.
36 for the origins of ‘EU as a civilian power’, see f. Duchêne, ‘Europe’s Role in World Peace’, 
in R. Mayne (ed.), Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead (London: fontana 1972). 
for a review of ‘EU as civilian power’, see e.g. J. Orbie, ‘Civilian Power Europe: Review of the 
Original and Current Debates’, 41 Cooperation and Conflict 2006. for a recent contribution on 
‘EU as a normative power’, see e.g. I. Manners, ‘Assessing the decennial, reassessing the global: 
Understanding European Union normative power in global politics’, 48 Cooperation and Conflict 
2013.
37 At the time of writing it is unclear what concrete impact for instance the EU sanctions have 
on Russia, but they are undoubtedly more effective than calls by advocacy groups who do not 
possess similar leverage. for a summary of EU sanctions against Russia, see e.g. European 
Union, ‘EU sanctions against Russia over Ukraine crisis’, European Union Newsroom, avaliable 
at <http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu_sanctions/index_en.htm>.
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tional society. In terms of the international community, states are not the only 
relevant actors. The domestic and transnational civil society, individuals, ad-
vocacy groups, women’s groups, and the private sector play important roles in 
shaping international responses to crimes and violations relating to RtoP.38 
The work done by such non-state actors and by such unique actors as the EU, 
might be more efficient, if these various actors coordinated their efforts at least 
to some extent. Such coordination is something in which the EU could use its 
unique position better.39
3. ThE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS A CONfIGURATION
for some, the international community is synonymous with the international 
society, or the society of sovereign states.40 Accordingly, differences in use are 
allegedly more due to the users of this concept rather than due to substance. 
Supposedly journalists and practitioners prefer ‘international community’, while 
apparently theorists and scholars use ‘international society.’41 Yet, this is hard-
ly the only appropriate interpretation. As seen above, for example the UN 
Secretary-General clearly distinguishes between the two concepts in significant 
ways.
To explain, the concept ‘international society’ is habitually distinguished from 
the concept ‘international system’. The latter is understood in a minimal sense, 
as existing between states when there is sufficient interaction, so that the ac-
tions of one affect the calculations of others. The international system ‘implies 
no more than a sustained and structured pattern of interaction.’42 In contrast, 
the international society is distinguished from such a minimal condition by be-
ing marked ‘by dialogue and […] common rules and institutions for the conduct 
of their relations, and [the actors, states] recognise their common interest in 
maintaining these arrangements.’43 The notion of an international society em-
phasises the presence of common international rules and institutions.44 Yet, 
like with the international system, the usual main actors of the international 
society are states. The Secretary-General does not deny the importance of 
states in his reference to the international community, but he does emphasise 
how other, non-state actors (domestic and transnational civil society, individu-
als, advocacy groups, women’s groups, and the private sector) play important 
roles in shaping international responses to crimes and violations relating to 
38 See United Nations General Assembly, supra note 21, para. 59.
39 I forego discussing whether such coordination is a necessary aspect of the international 
community.
40 See e.g. N. J. Wheeler and T. Dunne, ‘Good International Citizenship: A Third Way for Brit-
ish foreign Policy’, 74 International Affairs 1998, fn. 28. 
41 T. Dunne, ‘Sociological Investigations: Instrumental, Legitimist and Coercive Interpreta-
tions of International Society’, 30 Millennium 2001, fn. 21.
42 B. Buzan and A. Gonzalez-Pelaez, ‘International Community’ after Iraq’, 81 International 
Affairs 2005, at 33.
43 hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: 
 Oxford University Press, 1984), 1.
44 Bull, The Anarchical Society: A study of order in world politics.
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RtoP.45 This is sufficient evidence to at least consider that, for the Secretary-
General, the international community is not simply synonymous with the inter-
national society, and that therefore, the international community referred to in 
the RtoP framework is not simply the society of sovereign states.
The Secretary-General is not alone in distinguishing between the concepts 
‘international community’ and ‘international society’. Generally speaking, among 
those who make this distinction, one can identify ‘those who see the interna-
tional community as some form of moral collectivity of humankind, which exists 
as an ethical referent even if not organized in any way, and those who see it 
as some of agent possessing the capacity for action.’46 In the first category 
fall such understandings as ‘the community of international opinion generated 
by modern communications’47 and a Kantian, ‘cosmopolitan community of 
humankind;’48 a ‘moral concept that in turn can shape institutions and inform 
policy choices.’49 Possibly it refers to a ‘shared vision of a better world for all 
people.’50 To the extent that this is true, it may refer to something ‘virtual,’ to 
a ‘potential source of power, to promote common cause or legitimize common 
action.’51
Less abstract understandings of the international community consider it to 
refer to some collectivity with agency. here, though, there are multiple possi-
bilities. for some, it refers to a particular international organisation, the UN.52 
for others it concerns a community of national citizenries,53 or the wealthy 
and developed states, ‘notably those in North America and Europe,’54 ‘essen-
tially the United States and Europe.’55 The latter, some argue, is the concept’s 
technical sense, a shorthand reference to ‘the United States joined by some 
allies and clients.’56 ‘Coalitions of the willing,’ some would say.57
Before proceeding, three things are worth noting. first, highly abstract uses 
of the concept ‘international community’ are not as relevant as more concrete 
understandings in the present discussion. This is because the role expected 
from the international community regarding global human security, as illus-
trated by the responsibilities assigned to it by the World Summit Outcome, are 
quite concrete. At stake is not simply a vision for a better world for all peoples, 
although that is part of it, but also an attempt to assign responsibilities and hold 
accountable particular actors regarding preventative and reactive measures, 
45 See United Nations General Assembly, supra note 14, para. 59.
46 See B. Buzan and A. Gonzalez-Pelaez, supra note 42, at 32.
47 A. Gowers, ‘The Power of Two’, 132 Foreign Policy 2002, at 32.
48 R. Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States (New York: Ox-
ford University Press 2000), at 341.
49 J. Bryan hehir, ‘The limits of loyalty’, 132 Foreign Policy 2002, at 38.
50 K. A. Annan, ‘Problems without passports’, 132 Foreign Policy 2002, at 30.
51 S. Ogata, ‘Guilty parties’, 132 Foreign Policy 2002, at 40.
52 See K. A. Annan, supra note 50.
53 See E. G. Jackson, supra note 48, at 341.
54 A. Appadurai, ‘Broken promises’, 132 Foreign Policy 2002, at 43.
55 See A. Gowers, supra note 47.
56 N. Chomsky, ‘The crimes of ‘Intcom’’, 132 Foreign Policy 2002, at 34.
57 D. C. Ellis, ‘On the Possibility of ‘International Community’’, 11 International Studies Re-
view 2009, at 10.
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with respect to the four RtoP crimes. Second, as is evident already in the above 
examples, the international community is not a formal organisation but both an 
elusive concept and an indeterminate collectivity. There does not seem to be 
clear consensus as to which particular actors the concept ‘the international 
community’ refers. Third, it seems from the more concrete examples above 
that behind the use of the concept ‘international community’, is a reference to 
some group ‘out there’, and the question seems to be what makes this group 
a community, rather than a society or something else. I continue this last thought 
next. 
3.1 orthodox approaches to the international community
The international community (as conceptually distinct from the international 
society) has been examined mainly via two foci: we-feeling and common ethos. 
for instance, the North Atlantic area has been referred to as an example of an 
international community already by Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s, 
due to the perceived we-feeling among the relevant states.58 This trend has 
continued more recently in relation to security communities.59 In such works, 
communities are approached via shared identities, which blur a distinction 
between Self and Other: ‘the boundaries of Self and Other [are redefined] so 
as to constitute a “common in-group identity” or “we-feeling”.’60 Such shared 
identities may evolve through various historical, shared processes ranging from 
religion and economy to science and law.61 here, as an example, one can 
consider ‘the West’. If one compares the West with ‘the Rest’, one notices 
shared historical processes and at least a weak we-feeling or a form of iden-
tity, which differs for instance from those in Africa, due to colonisation pro-
cesses among others, even though there are of course differences in ‘the West’, 
too.62 Note that within the West there are areas which share a deeper we-
feeling than the West in general. Equally, it may be that some parts of ‘the Rest’ 
are closer to, say, the European group identity than other parts of ‘the Rest’.
To an extent, these two main orthodox approaches are quite similar. A focus 
on common ethos does not seem to differ much from a focus on we-feeling. 
Yet, some distinctions are evident. Rather than emphasising a shared identity, 
a common ethos approach draws attention more broadly to shared ‘norms, 
rules, identities, and views of moral conduct.’63 Alternatively, one might say 
58 Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization 
in Light of Historical Experience (Salt Lake City: Aadvark Global 1954/2006). See also f. Tönnies, 
Community and Civil Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001).
59 See e.g. E. Adler and M. Barnett, ‘Governing Anarchy: A Research Agenda for the Study 
of Security Communities’, 10 Ethics and International Affairs 1996; E. Adler and M. Barnett (eds.), 
Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998).
60 A. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1999), at 338.
61 See B. Buzan and A. Gonzalez-Pelaez, supra note 42, at 37.
62 Ibid. Also, of course there are differences among ‘the Rest’. 
63 See D. C. Ellis, supra note 56. See also f. Schimmelfennig, ‘Goffman Meets IR: Dramatur-
gical Action in International Community’, 12 International Review of Sociology 2002.
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that the international community has a ‘raison d’être, all its own.’64 Whether 
such distinctions are significant is perhaps an empirical question. More certain 
seems the similar weight given in both approaches to historical processes and 
interaction in the emergence of international communities. furthermore, both 
approaches imply that once evolved, international communities are relatively 
stable. In turn, this implies that – while there may be more than one interna-
tional community in the world – a given international community is something 
‘out there,’ or at least a fitting description of a collection of actors and their 
relations. 
The EU would be a candidate for an international community on both ac-
counts. The answer might be clearer if one adopted a common ethos approach, 
since undoubtedly the EU embodies and promotes shared norms, rules, iden-
tities and views of moral conduct among its members. If one were to adopt an 
approach emphasising a we-feeling or a shared identity, the question would 
turn to the relative strength of a European identity, as compared with national 
or other identities, as well as, how such a shared identity could be measured.65 
Yet, at least two considerations imply that ‘the EU as an international commu-
nity’ is not of central importance to the present discussion. first, asking wheth-
er the EU is an international community hides more suitable candidate concepts 
for understanding the EU, such as ‘compound republic.’66 Second, the EU 
would at best be a regional international community, and the present discussion 
is focused on the international community as understood with regard to RtoP 
and global human security.
3.2 an alternative understanding of ‘international community’
The approaches outlined above pose challenges to understanding which ac-
tual international actors are understood to compose the international commu-
nity, which is referred to in the World Summit Outcome and in the UN 
Secretary-General’s report. It is difficult to see that there would be anything but 
an extremely thin shared identity or ethos among all General Assembly mem-
bers, which most likely would not amount to much beyond the notion of ‘we, 
the sovereigns’.67 Moreover, if one adopts the Secretary-General’s understand-
ing of the international community membership, it is even more difficult to see 
a shared identity and ethos among such diverse actors. It might be possible, 
if one were to restrict for example one’s understanding of a common ethos to 
64 See D. C. Ellis, supra note 57, at 15.
65 One proxy could be voting turnout. If one examines EU Parliament elections, the voting 
turnout has been below 50% since the 1999 elections, thus questioning the strength of a Euro-
pean political identity. Yet, other aspects of a shared European identity are not revealed by such 
a crude measure.
66 See e.g. A. Glencross, ‘federalism, Confederalism and Sovereignty Claims: Understand-
ing the Democracy Game in the EU’, SGIR Conference (September 2007); A. Glencross, ‘A Post-
National EU? The Problem of Legitimising the EU without the Nation and National Representa-
tion’, 59 Political Studies 2011.
67 A shared ‘we, the sovereigns’ identity is an indication of an international society, and it is 
not necessarily sufficient indication of an international community.
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some notion of doing good for humankind. Yet, such abstractness would be 
counterproductive, since the RtoP framework aims to be concrete in assigning 
responsibilities rather than to be an abstract declaration. furthermore, if one 
emphasises the strength of shared identities or ethos as indicators of an inter-
national community, Europe and the North Atlantic and especially the EU are 
strong candidates for regional international communities, possibly the strongest 
candidates in the world. Yet, as already mentioned, at stake is the global inter-
national community, since RtoP applies worldwide, not to mention other contexts 
with references to the international community, where it is clearly used with 
reference to a global concern. 
Rather than attempting to answer such questions, which seem prima facie 
rather difficult to answer satisfactorily, I take a step back and consider an al-
ternative understanding of the international community. Much of the discussion 
above follows from the sociological distinction made at the beginning between 
a society and a community, with reference to some existing collection of actors. 
The question was, after all, whether two groups of people merit the use of the 
same concept, or whether the differences in their organisations justify the use 
of two different concepts. But one need not begin from such a sociological 
distinction or from an examination of existing groups. It is possible to begin with 
the political and to consider that the concept ‘international community’ need 
not refer to any group in relatively stable existence. Instead, we can consider 
that the use of this concept is a form of speech act, meant to bind various ac-
tors together for particular purposes within a given context. In other words, 
rather than referring to some existing group that share an ethos or a common 
identity, my alternative approach to understanding the concept of ‘interna-
tional community’ considers not an existing group of actors, which already share 
something, but a potential configuration of actors that should exist. To put it 
differently, the use of this concept is not simply a reference to something ‘out 
there’. Its use aims to constitute the very thing to which it refers.68
In this alternative view, the World Summit Outcome does not refer to some 
existing international community ‘out there’, but it aims to establish both the 
collective vicarious responsibility to ensure at least minimal global human se-
curity and the collectivity holding it. Yet, we need not think that once brought 
to existence, this collectivity remains relatively stable. In contrast, we could 
consider that the international community is brought into existence anew in 
each relevant context, on a case-by-case basis, thus allowing for instance its 
membership to vary from case to case. In this second sense, a grouping of 
actors would constitute the international community within a particular context, 
but the actors composing that group need not be consistently always the same 
from one context to another. This is in line with paragraph 139 of the Outcome 
document, which states that the international community is prepared to take 
collective action on a case-by-case basis. If action is to be taken on such basis, 
68 for a more detailed account, see Peltonen, ‘In or out? International community member-
ship: beliefs, behaviour, contextuality and principles’, available at <http://www.tandfonline.com/
doi/pdf/10.1080/09557571.2012.684669>.
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it is possible to consider that the group of actors taking it is also determined on 
a case-by-case basis. 
Thus, contrary to the orthodox approaches, the proposal put forward here 
is that the international community or its membership is not determined a pri-
ori on the basis of a common identity or ethos, but on the basis of contextual 
relevance and requirements as determined by the case at hand. To that extent, 
then, the concept ‘international community’ is not a reference to some existing 
group but a means of bringing together configurations of various actors for 
particular purposes on a case-by-case basis. 
In this paper I have used RtoP as my foil, and therefore it seems appropriate 
to exemplify what I mean with an RtoP example. Consider Security Council 
Resolution 1973 on Libya, usually understood as a direct reference to RtoP.69 
To keep the example short and to the point; the international community acted 
as a result of this particular resolution, and the international community used 
force to protect Libyan populations,70 but the actors, which authorised the use 
of force, differ from those who actually used force in Libya. Both of these groups 
of actors differ from the much wider group who may be said to have failed in 
prevention, which is part of RtoP. Moreover, the group of actors, who ought to 
have been part of rebuilding the Libyan state and society, had external interven-
tion and reached its goals, would again differ from the previous groupings, as 
does the group of actors who are and should be part of contemporary interna-
tional assistance and capacity building. In all of these phases – prevention, 
reaction and rebuilding – the international community is assigned some re-
sponsibility (and therefore also at least some authority) in the World Summit 
Outcome. Yet, if we look at the actors composing the international community 
in each of these phases, we either have different international communities or, 
better in accordance my proposal in this paper, the concept ‘international com-
munity’ operates to form the group for a particular purpose and in a particular 
context. Some of the actors might be the same in each phase, but others may 
be relevant in only one or two of the phases. In this sense, the concept ‘inter-
national community’ is a means of bringing about a configuration of relevant 
actors on a case-by-case, and even phase-by-phase basis, while simultane-
ously maintaining the authority and responsibilities given to such a collectivity.
furthermore, it is relatively easy to see, how a change of context would also 
alter the relevant actors forming the international community. Consider, instead 
of the RtoP, the global financial situation or climate change. Since some inter-
national actors are so prominent in various global issues, they would be relevant 
to any configuration deemed responsible for finding solutions to human secu-
rity, global finance, or climate change. Yet, there are numerous actors who 
would be relevant as ‘members of the international community’ in one context 
but not in the other two contexts. To exemplify, the United States and the EU 
(or many if not most of its individual members) would be relevant to all three 
69 United Nations Security Council, ‘Security Council Resolution Number 1973 of March 17 
2011’ (2011).
70 Naturally the case is more complex than presented here, but details have been sacrificed 
for clarity of illustration.
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global themes. Yet, for instance Saudi Arabia is relevant if considering global 
finance and climate change, and India and China are especially relevant if 
considering climate change and global finance, whereas China would be most 
relevant due to its permanent member status, if for example humanitarian in-
tervention was proposed at the Security Council. If one considers the context 
of human security, such non-governmental organisations as the Red Cross are 
highly relevant, but they would be somewhat odd additions within the contexts 
of global finance and climate change.71 As these illustrations hope to show, 
my proposed alternative understanding of the international community explains 
why, at times, its membership may differ rather radically without the different 
membership indicating a different international community. 
4. ThE EU AND CONfIGURING ThE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
The discussion so far has applicability for the EU regarding global human se-
curity. To return to my primary example in this paper, RtoP, the UN Secretary-
General has emphasised the different actions that members of the 
international community ought to take in order to ensure that the collective 
responsibility to protect populations from grave human insecurity is fulfilled. 
Particularly the second pillar in his approach deals with the active partnership 
between the international community and individual states. To recall, the Sec-
retary-General understands the international community to be composed of 
not just states and their organisations, but also of such actors as the domestic 
and transnational civil society, individuals, advocacy groups, women’s groups 
and the private sector. If one were to understand the international community 
in the orthodox manner, one would need to find a common ethos or some kind 
of a common identity shared by the various actors mentioned by the UN Sec-
retary-General. Yet, in all likelihood, such shared ethos or identity would be 
rather thin, quite abstract, or non-existent. 
In contrast, if one were to adopt the alternative proposal, presented in this 
paper, to understanding the international community as a context-dependent 
configuration, one does not need to find a shared identity or ethos when de-
termining membership. Instead, one ought to begin with the tasks and their 
requirements, and then move on to considering which actors could contribute 
constructively. 
Note here, though, that constructive contribution does not refer only to like-
minded actors (colloquially one might say ‘yes-men’), since criticism and a 
system of checks-and-balances is needed in any collective project. The impor-
tant aspect is therefore not to simply look for those who share the same ethos 
or identity – the very opposite of what one would do if one used the orthodox 
approaches! – but for those who can and should contribute to solving the task 
at hand, even if by providing a critical voice to deliberations. This clearly requires 
one to leave behind traditional notions of who are the relevant actors simply 
71 Possibly the Red Cross would not be totally irrelevant, but I hope the gist of the example 
is conveyed.
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on the basis of status, and to that extent it may be challenging. Yet, as we see 
every day at least in the field of human security, there are numerous varied 
actors who are contributing to improving human life and health globally – and 
many of these actors hold no traditional status as relevant actors in interna-
tional politics. 
This brings me to the double opportunity for the EU which is provided by 
re-thinking the international community. The dynamic understanding of the 
international community is challenging, because it implies fluidity. Yet, the same 
dynamism implies that one need not be ‘stuck’ with the same actors from the 
beginning until the end. Thus, one needs coordination and leadership, first of 
all, in establishing a given configuration as the international community within 
a particular context and, second, in ensuring that the membership remains 
relevant throughout the process and collective action. for instance, the begin-
ning of a humanitarian RtoP operation requires different kinds of actors as 
later stages. Yet, it is not self-evident who decides, and how, which actors are 
relevant in each stage, and this, I suggest, is an opportunity for the EU.
I have argued that the international community has certain collective respon-
sibilities, some of which are determined on a case-by-case basis. I have also 
argued that the international community itself is best understood as a context-
dependent configuration of actors. These two points open a need for some 
respectable and appropriate actor or organisation to play the role of a coordina-
tor and to assist in configuring which actors are to form the international com-
munity within particular contexts. While many might look at the United Nations 
or the United States as the appropriate actor or organisation, I would like to 
suggest that the EU is a unique organisation for this position. It wields more 
legitimacy and normative power than the United States in the eyes of many, 
and it is more efficient than the United Nations. The EU has connections either 
directly or indirectly with other relevant international organisations – not to 
mention the networks which individual EU members hold. Moreover, based 
within the EU are a number of those various actors that the Secretary-Gener-
al mentioned as relevant to RtoP: the domestic and transnational civil society, 
individuals, advocacy groups, and women’s groups. These diverse actors may 
contribute directly to RtoP operations, but the EU could channel their efforts 
by helping in coordinating them. Moreover, these diverse non-state actors 
within the EU could operate as a system of checks-and-balances on the EU 
itself. The existence of such a system would enhance the EU’s legitimacy in 
its coordinator role. furthermore, by taking the role of a coordinator, the EU 
would ensure its relevance in all cases in which calls are made to the interna-
tional community. At the same time, the EU could legitimately reduce its other 
roles and contributions, since it would already be contributing in a highly sig-
nificant manner by operating as a coordinator. One should note, though, that 
taking on a coordinator role would also entail accountability, since in cases of 
failure many would turn their eyes on whichever actor was responsible for the 
coordination of diverse efforts.
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5. CONCLUSION
This paper aimed to understand what is meant by the concept ‘international 
community’ regarding global human security and the responsibility to protect, 
and why such a question might be of relevance to the EU. After having outlined 
the collective responsibility to protect and the international community’s roles 
present in the World Summit Outcome document, I suggested that the EU’s 
potential role as part of the international community comes out best in relation 
to RtoP’s second pillar, namely international assistance and capacity-building. 
As a second step, I reviewed orthodox understandings of the concept ‘in-
ternational community’ as distinguished from the concept ‘international society’. 
My argument was that such orthodox approaches, which focus either on a 
shared identity or a common ethos, appear to consider that the concept ‘inter-
national community’ refers to some collectivity ‘out there’. Instead, in my own 
proposed understanding of how this particular concept functions I emphasised 
that the concept ‘international community’ is not a reference to an existing group 
of actors, who share something, but part of the act of constituting the group in 
the first place. 
This led me to my third step; the EU is a unique actor to operate as the kind 
of coordinator implied by my fluid understanding of the international commu-
nity. If indeed the international community is best understood as a context-
dependent configuration, at least with regard to global human security, there 
is a need for some respectable actor to take the role of a coordinator, whose 
task would be the identification of appropriate and relevant actors to ‘be’ the 
international community within a given context and the oversight of ensuring 
that the ‘membership’ remains relevant throughout the different stages of col-
lective action. Given its normative power, its capabilities and networks as well 
as its quite autonomous standing from its members, at least on a number of 
human security issues, the EU would be a strong candidate for playing this 
role. Taking it on would allow the EU to maintain that it is fulfilling an important 
part of the collective responsibilities assigned to the international community 
– thus providing justifications for taking on less of other aspects of those col-
lective responsibilities – but it would also entail a certain risk. The coordinator 
role would imply high levels of accountability, since success or failure in a 
given case of collective action could be determined by the coordination of ef-
forts. It is, however, a risk worth taking for the EU, particularly since institution-
ally speaking, the EU has decades of experience in coordinating collective 
action by state and non-state actors.
This paper’s focus has been on human security. Between the lines it is pos-
sible to notice that the assumption has been that human security concerns 
positive and negative peace. Yet, it ought to be clear that global human secu-
rity cannot be isolated from other global concerns. To name two examples, 
global finance and climate change are not traditional human security concerns, 
but their interconnections are evident. Poorly performing or highly unequally 
functioning global financial system poses serious human security concerns 
around the globe. Similarly, it is not a question whether climate change will 
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have human security implications, but how and where human security will be 
(more) threatened as a result of our warming planet. 
As a final note, I would like to suggest that in addition to being potentially a 
significant coordinator regarding the international community and human se-
curity, the EU could play a similar role with regard to global finance and climate 
change. These three themes are interconnected and each of them requires 
collective action by the international community. Yet, the international com-
munity in each theme differs from the others in its membership. The EU, how-
ever, would probably be part of all such configurations of actors. In global 
finance, the EU is for instance a central actor in financial governance.72 In 
relation to climate change, the EU is home to high levels of development but 
with per capita greenhouse gas emission of approximately half of those of the 
USA.73 Especially the latter fact gives the EU significant normative weight in 
ongoing discussions regarding climate change and our global responses to it. 
In turn, this illustrates the EU’s capabilities to promote principles, values and 
best practices are some of the best in the world, and in so doing, the EU speaks 
with 28 voices. 
72 See e.g. D. Mügge (ed.), Europe and the Governance of Global Finance (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2014). Moreover, a recent IMf warning that the European banking system poses 
a threat to global financial stability drives home the point from the opposite perspective. See 
P. Inmann, ‘IMf warns Europe’s banking system poses threat to global financial stability’, The 
Guardian, 9 April 2014.
73 See e.g. J. Nolt, ‘Greenhouse gas emission and the domination of posterity’, D. G. Arnold 
(ed.), The Ethics of Global Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011).
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